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Criminal Tax Fraud: An Analytical Review
Ray A. Knight
Lee G.Knight"
I. INTRODUCTION
Today, there seems to be a lingering impression that tax-evasion is a type
of technical crime for bringing to justice those gangsters and racketeers who
might otherwise evade all punishment for their acts. However, a broad
spectrum of high-profile individuals have been convicted for tax crimes: Al
Capone and Mickey Cohen, former gangsters; Robert B. Anderson, former
Secretary of the Treasury; Joseph D. Nunan, Jr., former Commissioner of
Internal Revenue; Dave Beck, former president of the Teamsters Union;
Chuck Berry, rock and roll star; Albert Nippon, fashion designer; Mario
Biaggi, former congressman and, as of 1989, the most decorated New York
City policeman; Spiro Agnew, former Vice-President of the United States;
Dana Kirk, former basketball coach at Memphis State University; Robert
Huttenbach, Chancellor at the University of California at Santa Barbara;
Victor Posner, 'millionaire industrialist; Harry Reems, co-star of the porn
classic "Deep Throat;" Leona Helmsley, the "Queen" of the Helmsley Hotel
chain; Moses Annenberg, the founder of TV Guide; and Pete Rose, former
baseball player and manager.
By the same token, it should be noted that equally great attention is
afforded enforcement against the everyday citizen who is otherwise law
abiding and is frequently a prominent member of his community. For
example, in the same annual report which contained boasting about the
organized crime efforts in Newark, New Jersey, and other areas, one also finds
listed among the Internal Revenue Service's ("Service") prosecution victories
a physician, an optometrist, two lawyers, a real estate promoter, a philosophy
professor and a multimillionaire clothing manufacturer who were sentenced
to prison for their various evasions of tax.' Its well-publicized efforts in this
area are recurrently set out (e.g., from the 1970s to the 1990s) with some
degree of pride in the annual reports of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
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("Commissioner"). 2 The Service likewise appears to be extending its criminal
enforcement activities into areas of legitimate business not previously subject
to such exacting scrutiny. In 1982 the Commissioner announced that the
Service had discovered widespread tax fraud among large business corporations and would make such taxpayers the object of special enforcement
3
efforts.
Criminal tax enforcement includes a process which has long been
characterized by prosecutions of highly visible individuals who have violated
only the tax laws, as well as prosecutions for tax crimes of persons also
engaged in nontax criminal activity. Indeed, the violation of criminal tax
statutes has long been a natural and frequently inevitable handmaiden of the
commission of many nontax crimes.
Recent statutory changes in federal criminal law, however, have
multiplied the potential federal criminal violations that may now accompany
what historically would have been solely state crimes. The most important of4
these are the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations statute (RICO),
the Continuing Criminal Enterprise provisions, 5 the Bank Secrecy Act,6 the
money laundering prohibitions, 7 the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act,8 and
other federal drug offense legislation.
The financial investigation skills of the Service's special agents can and
do serve an important function in detecting and successfully prosecuting
nontax federal financial crimes, most notably violations of the Bank Secrecy
Act and money laundering statutes. Thus, it is no surprise that recent years
have witnessed a significant shift of the Service's law enforcement resources
in the direction of developing cases against narcotics dealers and other
criminals. What is surprising, however, is that this predominantly nontax law
enforcement effort may be of sufficient magnitude to raise questions
concerning the continuing ability of the Service at current budget levels to use
criminal enforcement adequately to fulfill its primary mission of assuring
maximum compliance with federal tax laws. Although the share of the
Service's budget devoted to criminal enforcement has remained relatively

2. Richard M. Roberts & Richard F. Riley, Jr., A-1, CriminalTax Procedure,162
T.M. (1987).
3. Id.
4. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
5. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988).
6. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829(b), 1951-1959 (1988).
7. 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464, 1786, 1817, 1818, 3403, 3413 (1988); 18 U.S.C. §§ 981,
982,1952,1956,1957,1961,2516 (1988); 31 U.S.C. §§ 5312,5316-5318,5321,5322
(1988).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988); 19 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1600, 1602, 1605-1612, 1644
(1988); 21 U.S.C. §§ 824, 848, 853, 854, 881, 970 (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 524 (1988).
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constant throughout the past decade, at about 5 3/4% of the total budget,9 the
increasing role of the Service in enforcing nontax federal crimes, perhaps in
combination with the declining audit rate, has changed the sources of the
Service's criminal prosecutions. Far fewer cases now originate with
examination. For example, audits, which-withholding aside-historically
have been the Service's principal tax enforcement weapon, have declined
significantly over the past two decades. The total audit coverage of
individuals has shown a steady decline during the past decade from an audit
rate of about 2% in 1978 to 1% in 1988.0 If one goes back further in time,
the decline is even more ,precipitous; audit coverage exceeded 6% in 1965.
The selection of cases for criminal investigation that more frequently lead
to prosecution and conviction cannot be attributed solely to the Service's
criminal investigation division. Although the entire Service's criminal
enforcement program has as its goal improving voluntary compliance with the
tax laws, 1 many convictions result from the Service's participation in law
enforcement efforts directed principally at nontax criminal activity, most
significantly involving drugs, money laundering or organized crime. The
Service historically has classified cases as falling into either the General
Enforcement Program ("GEP"), the category of cases in which violations of
the criminal tax statutes are principally at issue, or the Special Enforcement
Program ("SEP"), which includes
cases in which a nontax crime is typically
2
coupled with a tax crime.'

9. Budget data can be found in 1970-1988 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMM'R OF
INTERNAL REVENUE.

10. Data on audit rates can be found in 1978-1988 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
COMM'R OF INTERNAL REVENUE.

11. I.R.M. § 915 (1987).
12. I.R.M. § 9153 (1987) states:
[The Special Enforcement Program] encompasses the identification and
investigation of that segment of the public who derive substantial income
from illegal activities and violate the tax laws or other related statutes in
contravention of the Internal Revenue laws. The very nature of their
operations requires national coordination of enforcement efforts, close
cooperation and liaison with the Department of Justice and other Federal,
State and local law enforcement agencies (see IRM 9400).
Ld.
I.R.M. § 9152 (1987) states:
[The General Enforcement Program] encompasses all criminal enforcement
activities of the Criminal Investigation Division except those included in the
special enforcement program discussed in IRM 9153. The identification
and investigation of income tax evasion cases of substance with prosecution
potential is a primary objective. The program also provides for balanced
coverage as to types of violations, as well as geographic locations and
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As a practical matter the Service may be more likely to press a case
involving a locally prominent taxpayer than a relatively obscure person. The
basic reason for this is that the maximum deterrent, in the view of the Service,
comes from prosecution of the otherwise reputable taxpayer.13 Similarly, in
the case of celebrities or nationally prominent persons, indictment will be
sought for their national publicity and deterrent value although the process of
internal review is apparently more stringent in such instances. Exemplary of
the philosophy of the Service is the following statement:
The criminal prosecution of tax fraud cases is required as a deterrent to tax
evasion. Relatively few cases are prosecuted-around 700 or 800 a year
out of 75 or 80 million corporate and individual taxpayers. The Service's
objective is to get maximum deterrent value from the few cases prosecuted. 14
Thus, a criminal tax fraud is a viable and realistic problem faced by a wide
variety of taxpayers.
And, although one often finds widespread resentment against "high taxes"
and concomitant resort by taxpayers to any means or devices short of clear
illegality in the desperate effort to reduce the "tax bite," there is little
indication that the strong enforcement procedures for tax evasion lack "public
support." Apparently, as one author notes, "[this] is but another vivid
demonstration of the American penchant for following double standards' of
morality .... "'
Because the statutory definition of criminal tax evasion is extremely
broad, the decision as to who should or should not be prosecuted on this
charge has been mainly an administrative one. Since 1939, there have been
no significant legislative changes in the tax evasion field, but there have been
many significant developments which stem from administrative attitudes and
court decisions. In light of this, the objective of this article is to examine the
major developments and problems which have been raised since the 1950's.

economic and vocational status of violators as considered necessary to
stimulate voluntary compliance.
Id.
13. I.R.M. § 9161.1 (1987). As an overriding goal, the service aims to investigate
and prosecute high-profile taxpayers in order to "create maximum positive impact on
the compliance attitudes and practices of taxpayers" in general. In addition, "[t]he
Service will endeavor to obtain news coverage of its enforcement activities in order
to help deter violations of the internal revenue laws, and increase the confidence of
conscientious taxpayers that the Service prosecutes violators." Id. § 9161.6.
14. 1971 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 29.
15. Harry G.Balter, A Ten Year Review ofFraudProsecution,19 INST. ON FED.
TAx'N 1125, 1126 (1961).
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The research methodology utilized to achieve this objective consists primarily
of an analysis of court decisions rendered during the years under review, but
is supplemented by a review of the current literature. The findings generated
from these techniques are presented in three parts. First, background material
is provided via a general overview of the legislative provisions in Section II
of this Article and the administrative process in Section III. Finally, in
Section IV, some of the key developments and recurrent problems, as
evidenced in the court cases analyzed, are scrutinized with the hope of
delineating significant trends surrounding the criminal tax fraud area.

II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
As previously noted, the statutory definition of criminal tax fraud is
extremely broad. Basically, the statutory provisions to which a taxpayer may
be subjected in a criminal fraud investigation are found in the criminal
sections of the Internal Revenue Code ("Code"), principally Title 26 of the
United States Code, sections 7201-7207,16 and in the general criminal
provisions of Title 18 of the United States Code.
A. Code Provisions Unchanged
Although there was in evidence some pointed criticism directed at both
the legislative and administrative policies which had combined to subject the
tax evader to criminal felony charges in the early 1950's, the 1951-52 tax
scandals realistically ended prospects for any substantial change. 8 When the
Code was revised in 1954, no opposition was generated to the criminal
sections for tax evasion in the 1939 Code. 9
B. 26 U.S.C. Section 7201 0
The bulk of cases litigated involve suspected violations of section 7201.
It provides that
[a]ny person who willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any
tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof shall, in addition to other
penalties provided by law, be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction

16. I.R.C. §§ 7201-7207 (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
17. 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1-6005 (West 1988 & Supp. 1990).

18. Myron S. Winer, An AppraisalofCriminaland CivilPenaltiesin FederalTax
Evasion Cases, 33 B.U. L. REV. 387 (1953).
19. Baiter, supra note 15, at 1125.

20. I.R.C. § 7201 (1988).
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thereof, shall be fined not more than $10,000 ($500,000 in the case of a
corporation), or imprisoned
not more than 5 years, or both, together with
2
costs of prosecution. 1

Thus, the basic elements required for conviction under section 7201 are as
follows:
1. a tax due and owing for the year involved;
2. affirmative acts of wrongdoing; and
3. willfulness.2
Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged the breadth of the statute,
it has refused to impose judicial limitations in deference to the Court's belief
that Congress intended the evasion statute to remain unrestricted. In Spies v.
United States,? a landmark case, the Court stated that
Congress did not define or limit the methods by which a willful attempt to
defeat and evade might be accomplished and perhaps did not define lest its
efforts to do so result in some unexpected limitation. Nor would we by
definition constrict the scope of the
Congressional provision that it may be
4
accomplished "in any manner."2
Commentators have suggested that the purpose of the uncertainty of the
statute was to deter taxpayers from treading too closely to the line of legality
in their tax planning efforts.25 Other writers have pointed 'out that vagueness
can be a double-edged weapon which allows marginal acts of evasion to
escape prosecution. 26 In any event, the fact remains that section 7201 is
drawn in broad general terms; hence, its basic requirements have been the
subject of considerable refinement in the case law.
In Spies, the Supreme Court distinguished the felony of tax evasion from
the tax misdemeanors by focusing on the word "attempt." The Court
concluded that "in employing the terminology of attempt to embrace the
gravest of offenses against the revenues Congress intended some willful
commission in addition to the willful omissions that make up the list of
misdemeanors." 27 Thus, a willful failure to file a return, a misdemeanor
under section 7203 of the Code is not sufficient for section 720129 evasion
unless accompanied by some affirmative conduct evidencing an attempt to

21. Id.
22. United States v. Coppola, 425 F.2d 660,661 (2d Cir. 1969); Elewert v. United
States, 231 F.2d 928, 932-33 (9th Cir. 1956).
23. 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
24. Id. at 492-93.
25. Howard A. Heffron, Limitations in Fraud Cases, 19 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED.
TAX'N 1195, 1201 (1961).
26. BoRis KoSTEANETZ & Louis BENDER, CRIMINAL ASPECTS OF TAX FRAUD
CASES 10 (2d ed. 1967); Roberts & Riley, supra note 2, at A-5.
27. Spies, 317 U.S. at 499.
28. I.R.C. § 7203 (1988).
29. Id. § 7201.
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evade. However, a taxpayer who files false W-4 withholding certificates
claiming exempt status (thereby causing his employer to withhold no federal
taxes), and who fails to file a return, can be convicted of felony evasion. The
affirmative and willful act of filing the false withholding certificates satisfies
the Spies requirement.O° The Supreme Court has held that the filing of a
false tax return is a sufficient affirmative act to support a conviction under
section 7201.31
The Spies Court provided a list of "badges of fraud" that would support
an inference of the required willful attempt to evade tax. The list includes
keeping a double set of books, destruction of books or records, concealment
of assets or covering up sources of income, and "any conduct, the likely effect
of which would be to mislead or to conceal."3 2 The Internal Revenue
Manual contains a lengthy listing of conduct considered by the Service to be
a "badge of fraud. 3 3 Additional examples of the type of conduct that will
satisfy the affirmative act element include lying to Service agents, consistently
overstating deductions, holding property in nominee names, diverting
corporate funds to pay an officer's personal expenses, and concealing bank
accounts.O A taxpayer whose conduct amounts to one or more "badges of
fraud" will not only have satisfied the affirmative-act-to-evade element of
evasion, but will also have minimized her chances of defeating the element of
willfulness, since the "badges" are circumstantial evidence supporting
willfulness.35
Unless there is a deficiency in tax, a conviction under section 7201
cannot be sustained. 36 The elements of section 7201 that the government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt are: (1) the existence of a tax
deficiency; (2) an affirmative act of evasion or attempted evasion of tax; and
willfulness. 37 The Service need not prove the exact amount of the deficiency.8 However, some courts have indicated that the deficiency must be
"substantial," but this element is not based on either the statute or the principal
Supreme Court decisions construing it.3 9 The "substantiality" of a deficiency,
according to one court, "is not measured in terms of gross or net income nor
by an particular percentage of the tax shown to be due and payable. All the

30. See, e.g., United States v. House, 617 F. Supp. 240 (W.D. Mich. 1985).
31. Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1965).
32. Spies, 317 U.S. at 499.
33. I.R.M. § [4231] 940 (1987).
34. Id.
35. I.R.M. § [7231] 940 (1987); see, e.g., United States v. Beacon Brass Co., 344
U.S. 43, 45-46 (1952) (false statements to Treasury agents can constitute the willful
act); United States v. Thetford, 676 F.2d 170, 175 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1148 (1983) (unreported diversion of corporate monies can be the willful act).
36. Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965).
37. Id.
38. See United States. v. Canaday, 354 F.2d 849, 851 (8th Cir. 1966) (unsuccessful reliance on "substantiality" defense).
39. Sansone, 380 U.S. at 351; Spies, 317 U.S. at 499; United States v. Coppola,
425 F.2d 660, 661 (2d Cir. 1969).
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attendant circumstances must be taken into consideration."'
For example,
a taxpayer who refuses to cooperate during an audit, and whose suspicious or
criminal behavior prompts a criminal investigation, could be prosecuted and
convicted under section 7201 for omitting $2,500 in income (or overstating
deductions by a similar amount). Similarly, a "high-profile" individual, such
as a politician or entertainer, might be prosecuted and convicted under the
felony evasion statute for relatively minor transgressions, if committed
willfully and accompanied by the requisite affirmative act to evade. In these
circumstances, the deterrent effect of "making an example" of the individual
can outweigh the general reluctance to prosecute for relatively small
deficiencies.
C. 26 U.S.C. Section 720241
Although only a minimal amount of litigation has arisen from violations
of section 7202, it nonetheless poses a threat to the unwary. It provides that
[a]ny person required under this title to collect, account for, and pay over
any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect or truthfully
account for and pay over any such tax shall, in addition to other penalties
provided by law, be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof, shall be
fined not more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both,
together with costs of prosecution.42
In a Tenth Circuit decision, 43 the court definitively squelched a defendant's contention that he could not be guilty of failure to account since he
never collected the money. In part, the court's response was as follows:
This argument is specious ....

If the statute is followed [U.S.C. § 3102(a)

and § 3111(a)], the amount retained as taxes never leaves the employer's
possession. It is true that the employer makes the deductions for the benefit
of the United States, but he does not actually collect the tax; he merely
retains money already in his possession which is part of the employee's
wages .... If he delivers the deducted amounts to the employee or anyone
else, he still must file a return and account, and failure to do so violates the
general penalty Statute of 26 U.S.C. § 7202. 44
Based on this response and the relatively few litigated cases in the area, it
seems reasonable to conclude that the provisions in section 7202 are
sufficiently explicit, and there is little chance for a taxpayer to escape
prosecution if the provisions are violated.

40. United States v. Nunan, 236 F.2d 576, 585 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 912 (1957).

41.
42.
43.
(1970).
44.

I.R.C. § 7202 (1988).
Id.
United States v. Porth, 426 F.2d 519 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 824
Id. at 522.
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D. 26 U.S.C. Section 720345
A section 7203 conviction involves a willful failure to file. The degree
of willfulness under this misdemeanor statute is now identical to that required
for a section 7201 felony conviction." Section 7203 provides that
[a]ny person required under this title to pay any estimated tax or tax, or
required by this title or by regulations made under authority thereof to make
a return, keep any records, or supply any information, who willfully fails
to pay such estimated tax or taxes, make such return, keep such records, or
supply such information, at the time or times required by law or regulations,
shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be guilty of a
misdemeanor and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
not more
$25,000 ($100,000 in the case of a corporation),, or imprisoned
47
than one year, or both, together with the cost of prosecution.
A series of cases have burgeoned in recent years from this section-generally
coupled with a prosecution under section 7201. The discussion of the key
developments and problems arising from this interrelationship is reserved until
Section IV of this Article.
E. 26 U.S.C. Section 72044
During the years under review, there were no cases litigated under section
7204. Section 7204 provides for a fine of "not more than $1,000, or
imprisonment not more than one year, or both" for any person who willfully
furnishes a fraudulent statement or who willfully fails to furnish a statement
to employees in the manner required under section 6051 of the Code.49
F. 26 U.S.C. Section 72055 0
Relatively few cases have arisen under section 7205. Section 7205
provides for a fine not to exceed $1,000 or imprisonment of not more than
one year, or both, for any person convicted of either willfully supplying false
withholding information to his employer, or complete failure to supply such
information. The primary issue raised in the court cases prosecuted under
section 7205 is the definition of willfulness. Because this is applicable to all
sections it is reserved for discussion in Section IV of this Article.

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

I.R.C. § 7203 (1988).
United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346, 349 (1973).
I.R.C. § 7203 (1988).
Id. § 7204.
I.R.C. § 6051 (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
I.R.C. § 7205 (1988).
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G. 26 U.S.C. Section 72065'
A section 7206 conviction requires proof of willful making or subscribing
or willfully assisting in the preparation of a false return. This is also a felony
statute, and in order to get a conviction, the government need not prove a tax
deficiency.52 The case analysis for the years under review indicates the
recent popularity of this section among federal prosecutors. A return preparer
who knowingly makes a false statement on a return can be convicted under
section 7206(1), as well as section 7206(2). 53
One type of investigation that merits closer scrutiny involves "Multiple
Fraudulent Returns Prepared by Unscrupulous Return Preparers." This
frequent charge pertains either to section 7206(2), aiding or assisting in
preparation of false returns, or to section 371 of Title 18 of the United States
Code, the conspiracy statute. The government has been very successful in
prosecuting such violators by authorizing special agents to work in an
undercover status-i.e., to pose as a potential client with a fictitious W-2 form
and attempt to have his return prepared.55
H. 26 U.S.C. Section 720756
Section 7207 provides for a fine of not more than $10,000 ($50,000 in
the case of a corporation), imprisonment of not more than one year, or both,
to be inflicted upon any person who willfully delivers fraudulent returns,
statements, or other documents to the Secretary. Most of the litigation under
this section has been intertwined with violations of other sections, rendering
it difficult, if not impossible, to determine the noteworthy problems and
developments. However, this interrelationship, in and of itself, merits special
consideration, and thus is reserved for discussion in Section IV of this Article.
III. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES
Neither the Service nor the Department of Justice published any
procedural rules for the administrative handling of criminal tax cases until
1978. Attorneys or their clients were forced to rely upon secondary literature
by practitioners, reports of conferences between bar groups and representatives
of the Service or the Department of Justice, and information supplied by the
Service itself upon inquiry.57 In general, the representatives of the Service
were helpful in explaining the steps involved, but there were obvious
limitations to this approach. Now, however, as a result of the Freedom of

51. Id. § 7206.
52. United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1962).
53. United States v. Shortt Accountancy Corp., 785 F.2d 1448 (9th Cir. 1986).
54. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988).
55. United States v. Warner, 428 F.2d 730, 732 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
930 (1970).
56. I.R.C. § 7207 (1988).
57. Roberts & Riley, supra note 2, at A-1.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss1/8
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Information Act of 1978, the Service makes public its audit manuals for
both revenue and special agents. An outline of the procedures followed by
each agent in his investigations is provided. While many of the practical
aspects of dealing with the agents are not set out, one can find the directives
under which the agents operate and the precise mechanics of the investigation.
Obviously, this should afford opportunity for better prephration on the part of
defense counsel.
A. Intelligence Division
Special agents of the Service operate out of the Criminal Investigation
Division of the district office. 59 When a tax fraud investigation is approved
by the Intelligence Division, a revenue agent is assigned by the Audit Division
for a joint investigation, but he or she is specifically under the control of the
special agent.60 Moreover, until the criminal aspects of the case are terminat61
ed, no civil negotiation concerning the amount of the tax is allowed.
1. Functions of the Special Agent
The first point to be emphasized is that the special agent's investigation
is directed principally toward the development of a criminal case. He regards
himself as a criminal investigator and this is'the tone in which the "Handbook
for Special Agents, Intelligence Division,'' 62 (the "Manual") is written.
Although a special agent's efforts may produce no more than a civil case
because of factors beyond his control, the appearance of the special agent
signals the point at which a taxpayer becomes a prospective defendant.
Although court decisions frequently emphasize the nature of the special
agent's inquiry, one should not be under an illusion in this respect.
2. Sources of Assignment
A special agent becomes involved in a case only after some form of
referral.6 The Manual mentions the following sources:
1.
2.

the Audit or Collection Division of the Service;
data processing;

58. Pub. L No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 54 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552

(1988)).
59. I.R.M. § 9311.2 (1987). This administrative division operates at the district

level-almost no investigative functions are handled at the National Office of the
Service in Washington, D.C., which is concerned with policy and planning matters.
An organization chart may be obtained from the Service.
60. I.R.M. § 4565.32, 9781 (1987).
61. George D. Crowley, The Role of the PractitionerWhen His Client Faces a
Criminal Tax FraudInvestigation, 40 J. TAX'N 18 (1974).
62. Internal Revenue Manual, "Handbook for Special Agents," I.R.M. § 9900
(April 3, 1986) [hereinafter Manual].
63. I.R.M. § 4565.21 (1987).
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3.

other special agents;

4.

government agencies;

5.
6.

the public, including informants;
reports from financial institutions, such as Currency Transaction
Reports."

While the Collection Division, informants, and other government agencies are
regular sources of referrals, the most common, in all probability, is the audit
referral." Generally, a revenue agent's suspicions are aroused during the
course of a routine civil audit."
Once the examining revenue agent suspects a possible criminal violation,
he prepares a fraud referral report which is forwarded to the Intelligence
Division for evaluation. Upon acceptance of the case by Intelligence, it is
assigned to a special agent. The special agent gives the case preliminary
consideration to determine if a fraud investigation is warranted. If so, the case
is "jacketed," that is, a special investigation file is set up and the investigation
commenced. The special agent arranges the interviews, makes third party
contacts, and develops the criminal case.
3. Initial Considerations
An importaht consideration at this stage is jury appeal. While it is
difficult to evaluate the precise importance of this factor, it can be assumed
that the special agent will not readily expend his efforts in a pursuit that has
little probability of an ultimate conviction. The language of the Manualreads,
"[a]re there factors of age, health, intelligence, voluntary
disclosure or other
67
considerations which may render conviction unlikely?,
Of these factors, the most commonly misunderstood is voluntary
disclosure. The formal policy of granting immunity to those who voluntarily
disclose their fraudulent activities prior to the initiation of an investigation was
ended in 1952.' Nevertheless, the timely disclosure of the taxpayer's illegal
actions is still an important consideration in the Service's decision regarding
prosecution.6 The question of what constitutes the requisite disclosure is

64. I.R.M. § [4231] 910, 911 (1987).
65. I.R.M. § [4231] 911 (1987). The Special Agents Handbook provides that
fraud or indications of fraud are usually discovered during the course of an examination. See generally I.R.M. § 9781 (1987).
66. Roberts & Riley, supra note 2, at A-2.
67. Manual, supra note 62, at ch. 9781, §§ 210-234-.2.
68. Treasury Department Information Release S-2930 (Jan. 10, 1952).
69. I.R.M. § 9781 (1987). "It is the practice of the IRS that a voluntary
disclosure will be considered along with all other factors in the case determining
whether criminal prosecution will be recommended." Id. § 342.142(1). To qualify,
a taxpayer must make her disclosure before an investigation by the Service has begun
and before an event has occurred that would ordinarily alert the Service to the fraud.
Disclosure after the investigation has begun is not considered voluntary, and the
Service will pursue criminal and civil sanctions. Id.; see, e.g., Badaracco v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 464 U.S. 386 (1984) (taxpayers who filed correct
amended returns after grand jury subpoenaed their records were convicted for filing
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss1/8
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subject to varying interpretation. In one case, 7' an attorney mailed a letter
to the local district director and enclosed a cashier's check in the amount of
the estimated deficiency on behalf of his unnamed clients. This permitted the
clients to claim that they did not owe any money in taxes if a criminal case
did develop, while it let them keep their identity secret.
4. Prosecution Decision
If, subsequent to the initiation of the investigation, the agent discovers
there is little or no chance of successful prosecution, the Manual directs him
to withdraw from the case.72 While absent from the Manual's most recent
revision, Section 332 of the 1972 edition lists the following factors that may
warrant withdrawal:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

a key witness' death or his inability to testify;
inability to establish evidence of willfulness;
a small tax deficiency or a one-time case;
insufficient proof concerning the main criminal item;
a new court decision having a substantial bearing on the case
issues;
complete deterioration of the taxpayer's mental or physical
health and no prospect for eventual improvement, as a terminal
illness;
a plausible defense that cannot be disproved. 7 3

One caveat, however, bears heavily on the weight given to the above
factors. The decision to withdraw is most readily made at the initial stages
of the investigation. Once it is "substantially completed" there is much less
likelihood of discontinuance. The investigation will be considered substantially completed when one or more of the following conditions exists:
1.
2.
3.
4.

All significant investigative inquiries have been made,
The special agent has prepared a draft of his final report in the
case.
The investigation has progressed to the point where the taxpayer
would normally be afforded a final interview.
The documentary evidence in possession of a special agent with
respect to civil fraud features of the case is such that its submission to the cooperating officer would require the expenditure of
considerable time on his part in becoming familiar with such
evidence and preparing the detailed report necessary to present
74
that evidence.

false returns).
70. Ira L. Tilzer, ProtectingTaxpayers' Rights During the Tax FraudInvestigation Process,41 J. TAX'N 356 (1974).

71. Baird v. Koerner, 279 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1960).
72. Manual, supra note 62, at ch. 9900.
73. Id. § 332.
74. Thomas S. Charles, SpecialAgent'sManualGivesInsight into IRS Procedures
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In the typical context, according to section 100 of the IRS Law Enforcement ManualIX, criminal prosecutions are limited to cases in which (1) the
additional tax that will be generated from a successful prosecution is
substantial, (2) the crime appears to have been committed in three consecutive
years, or (3) the taxpayer's flagrant or repetitive conduct was so egregious that
the Service believes that it is virtually certain to obtain a conviction.

5. Steps Subsequent to Prosecution Recommendation
Upon completion of investigation, the special agent submits a detailed
report containing all the necessary facts to support his recommendation for
prosecution to his group chief. As a matter of policy, the Service usually
affords the taxpayer or her representative a "district intelligence conference"
with the special agent and his group chief before the report is approved, 75 but
76
it should be noted that no absolute right to this interview exists.
The service views the conference as an opportunity to fill any remaining
gaps in the proof of their case.' The dynamics of the conference, of course,
will vary among different conferees. However, the Service's conferees
generally state the alleged fraudulent features of the case, including the
method of proof relied upon by the special agent, and then await comment by
the taxpayer's representative. Useful information may be obtained from the
conferees in response to facts contrary to the investigation raised by the
taxpayer's representative.7'
If the report is approvedby the Intelligence Division, it is then forwarded
to the Assistant Regional Counsel (Intelligence). While Treasury Regulation
601.107(c) 79 provides for a further conference at this level, most practitioners
waive this opportunity as it does not serve an information-gathering purpose. ° The Assistant Regional Commissioner (Intelligence) will ordinarily
notify the taxpayer or counsel when he forwards the case to the Office of
Chief Counsel of the Service.
B. Regional Counsel (Enforcement)
When the special agent's report is approved by the Criminal Investigation
Division, it is submitted to the Enforcement office of the Regional Counsel in
the region where the referring Criminal Investigation Division is located."
The Regional Counsel provides legal advice to the Intelligence Division,'

for Tax FraudAudits, 43 J. TAX'N 290, 290-91 (1971).
75. Treas. Reg. § 601.107(b)(2) (1991).
76. United States v. Goldstein, 342 F. Supp. 661, 665-66 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
77. LR.M. § [9781] 363:1, 364 (1987).
78. Crowley, supra note 61, at 23-24.
79. Treas. Reg. § 601.107(c) (1991).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See Paul E. Treusch, Chief Counsel's Office: A Dynamic View of Its
OrganizationandProcedures:The 'Hows' andSomething of the 'Whys', 1960 S. CAL.
TAX INST. 19.
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including evaluation of evidentiary or other legal problems. If the regional
counsel finds any insolvable problems, he may return the matter to Intelligence for further investigation or he may decline to recommend prosecution.8 The standards for review are a determination that
1.
2.

the taxpayer is in fact guilty of tax evasion; and
there is reasonable probability of his conviction.8

The taxpayer or his counsel is offered another conference at this level.
this
conference, the Assistant Regional Counsel usually discloses the theory
In
of the case (e.g., method of proof, the amounts of understatement attributable
to criminal items, and the proposed civil liabilities). Apparently, the Regional
Counsel is not to substantiate or defend the criminal case to the taxpayer's
representative, instead the purpose is to permit the taxpayer to offer argument
and evidence on his behalf.8 Frank discussion of any legitimate issues at
this conference usually occurs.
C. Department of Justice
The special agent's report with appropriate recommendations is forwarded
to the Department of Justice, Tax Division, Criminal Section. Again, it is
accepted policy to offer the taxpayer or his attorney one conference at this
level. The standards for review in the Justice Department are similar to those
at Regional Counsel, although there is more concern with local prosecuThe Justice Department's attorney may make the following
tions.8
recommendations on the case:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

prosecution;
forwarding to U.S. Attorney with instructions for a grand jury
investigation of recalcitrant witnesses;
forwarding to U.S. Attorney with instructions that he exercise
discretionary judgment in light of local factors that may have
serious jury impact;
returning case to the Service for further specific investigation;
non-prosecution. 87
D. U.S. Attorney's Office

If the Department of Justice recommends prosecution, the case is
forwarded to the appropriate U.S. Attorney's Office, usually with instructions
While conferences do take place at the U.S.
to secure an indictment.'

83. Id. at 19-20.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. For a more detailed discussion of the difference between the two reviews, see
Harry G. Balter, Tax Fraud and Evasions, §§ 3.3-4, 3.4 (4th ed. 1976).
87. Crowley, supra note 61, at 23.
88. See Joseph S. Platt, Mr.Borderline in the DepartmentofJustice,TAX CAsEs
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Attorney's Office prior to indictment, they are not routinely granted.8 9 The
U.S. Attorney's Office usually has no authority to stop the criminal cases in
advance of the indictment but will on occasion return the matter to the Service
or Justice for further investigation, or present it to a grand jury for examination of unreliable witnesses. 90
E. Summary of CriminalProcedureAfter Referral to U.S. Attorney
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the
U.S. Attorney may
file a complaint before the U.S. Commissioner and obtain a warrant for the
arrest of the defendant or summons for his appearance. 9' The U.S. Marshal
for the district serves the summons or executes the warrant by arresting the
defendant. 2 In the case of arrest, the defendant is required to be brought
before the U.S. Commissioner "without unnecessary delay."93 The Commissioner informs the defendant of his rights and conducts a preliminary
examination unless it is waived by the defendant. 4 If the Commissioner
believes there is "probable cause to believe that an offense has been
committed and that the defendant has committed it," the Commissioner holds
the defendant over to answer in the United States District Court.95 The
Commissioner has the power to admit the defendant to bail. 6
The U.S. Attorney may choose to file information to present his evidence
to the grand jury and obtain an indictment if the offense to be charged is a
misdemeanor.97 After the filing of an information or indictment, the clerk
of the district court issues a summons or warrant as requested by the
government to bring, the defendant before the court.98 Similarly, a summons
or warrant can be obtained by submitting an application to the U.S. Commissioner which shows either that the information has been filed or that the
indictment has been returned by the grand jury.99 Upon the arrest of the
defendant under a warrant, the defendant must be brought promptly before the
Court or before the U.S. Commissioner for purposes of bail.W
After the defendant is arrested, he is required to be arraigned in
court.'
Arraignment under Rule 10 consists of reading the indictment or

PRAC. & PROC. 147 (1951); Robert M. Schmidt, Current Department of Justice
CriminalIncome Tax Policies, 38 TAXES 293 (1960); Turner L. Smith, Procedurein
Department ofJustice, TAX FRAUD CASES PRAC. AND PROC. 29, 33 (1951).
89. Smith, supra note 88, at 33-35.

90. Id.
91. - FED. R. CRIM. P. 3-4.
92. Id. 4(c).

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. 5(a).
Id. 5(b)-(c).
Id. 5(c).
Id. 9(c).
Id. 7(a).

98. Id. 9(a).

99. Id.
4(a).
100. Id. 9(c).
101. Id. 10.
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information to him and calling upon him to plead thereto. 0 2 At that time,
the defendant may plead guilty, not guilty, or with the consent of the court,
nolo contendere a (further discussed in Section IV of this Article).
As a practical matter, the common procedure in tax cases is for the
taxpayer's attorney to confer with the U.S. Attorney prior to the arrest of the
defendant on an indictment or information. At a preliminary conference
matters such as surrender, waiver of indictment, bail and similar matters are
agreed upon. Under Rule 7(a) of the FederalRules of CriminalProcedure,
an offense which may be punished by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year must be prosecuted by indictment unless indictment is waived. Any
other offense may be prosecuted by information or by indictment. A
defendant may waive indictment "after having been advised of the nature of
the charge and of [his] rights."'0 4 Such waiver must be given in open
court." 5 Normally, the taxpayer's counsel will have advised the attorney for
the government whether his client will waive indictment and, in such case, the
waiver of indictment will have been prepared by the U.S. Attorney in advance
of arraignment. At arraignment, the waiver of indictment is signed, the
information is filed, and the defendant pleads thereto. In certain cases, namely
where it feels that the publicity resulting from the indictment will be
beneficial in the administration of the tax laws, the Department of Justice has
indicated that it will refuse to accept a waiver of indictment and will insist
upon prosecuting the case upon indictment rather than information." °
F. Methods of Proof
The methods of proof of tax evasion extend from the simple direct proof
of the omission of a single specific item of income to the complex circumstantial net worth and bank deposit methods of proof that assets acquired by the
taxpayer represent unreported income. Two concepts, however, are common
to all methods of proof. First, the precise amount of the tax evaded need not
be proved; it is sufficient for the government to show that a substantial
amount of income was omitted from the taxpayer's return."°7 Second, the
government is free to use all legal evidence available to it to determine

102. Id.
103. Id. 11.
104. Id. 7(b).
105. Id.
106. Roberts & Riley, supra note 2, at A-9.
107. United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503 (1943); Gendelman v. United States,
191 F.2d 993 (9th Cir. 1951); Dawley v. United States, 186 F.2d 978 (4th Cir. 1951);
Brodella v. United States, 184 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1950); Stinnett v. United States, 173
F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1949); United States v. Rosenblum, 176 F.2d 321 (7th Cir. 1949);
Cave v. United States, 159 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1947); United States v. Schenck, 126
F.2d 702 (2d Cir. 1942); Gleckman v. United States, 8Q F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1934);
United States v. Stoehr, 100 F. Supp. 143 (M.D. Pa.), aff'd, 196 F.2d 276 (3d Cir.
1952).
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whether the taxpayer's books accurately reflect his financial history without.
first establishing the inadequacy of such books. l ~
The direct evidence or specific item method is the simplest method of
proving evasion. Proof may consist of little more than the taxpayer's return,
and the testimony and records of a third party showing the payment of an
unreported item of income to the taxpayer or the nonpayment of a claimed
deduction by the taxpayer, and some element of willfulness.' °9 On the other
hand, a net worth case may involve scores of witnesses and numerous
accounting exhibits reflecting literally years of investigation by the IRS.
The circumstantial method of proof in common use today developed
during the period commencing with the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Johnson, 10 and ending with its 1954 decision in United States v.
Holland."' Except for a period of refinement in the middle 1950's following Holland and its companion cases, these methods remain substantially
unchanged over the last twenty-five years. 1 Based upon the reported cases,
it appears that taxpayers as well have developed little or nothing new in the
way of defenses.
Although the cases repeatedly reaffirm the proposition that the government has the burden of proving each element of tax evasion beyond
reasonable doubt, the practical result of the use of circumstantial methods is
that the taxpayer must come forward with an affirmative case."' Proof of
an unexplained accumulation of assets tends to be tainted as proof of
unreported taxable income. After the government shows a likely source and
negates nontaxable sources for the accumulation, the taxpayer remains silent
"at his peril." In light of this realization, it is obviously essential for the
taxpayer's representative to be familiar with the methods of proving a
deficiency. Only then is he afforded the opportunity to determine the
direction of investigation and the problem areas involved.
1. Net Worth Method
The best known of the circumstantial methods of proof of evasion is the
net worth method. Although this method was originally used against
taxpayers whose principal source of income was some kind of illegal activity,
it is now regularly applied to routine cases of tax evasion where other methods
of proof are insufficient.11 4 The springboard for the current use of the net

108. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954); McKenna v. United States,
.232 F.2d 431 (8th Cir. 1956); Clark v. United States, 211 F.2d 100 (8th Cir. 1954).
109. Roberts & Riley, supra note 2, at A-1 to A-5.
110. 319 U.S. 503 (1943).
111. 348 U.S. 121 (1954).

112. For a more detailed discussion of this refinement, see Baiter, supra note 15,
at 1125-58.
113. Holland, 348 U.S. at 139.
114. Demetree v. United States, 207 F.2d 892 (5th Cir. 1953); United States v.
Fenwick, 177 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1949); United States v. Clark, 123 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.
Cal. 1954); Joseph W. Bums & Mary L. Rachlin, How to Defend Net Worth Cases,
32 TAxEs 537 (1954).
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worth method was the decision of the Supreme Court in Holland v. United
States and the series of companion cases." The Supreme Court granted an
overall review of the net worth method because "it involved something more
than the ordinary use of circumstantial evidence in the usual criminal case"
the final volley to the first shot in the Government's
and had "evolved from
6
battle for revenue.11
Although frequently complex in application, the theory of the net worth
method of computing income is simple. Basically, the following steps lead
to the determination of the increase in net worth:

19921

1.
2.
3.

4.

5.

6.

Determine all assets and liabilities of the taxpayer on a cost basis
as of the beginning and end of the first year in question.
Subtract the total liabilities from the total assets.
Extend the same mechanical analysis to the assets and liabilities
of all subsequent years involved in the case to demonstrate the
"increase" or "decrease" in net worth over the period of years.
Add all nondeductible items, such as nondeductible living and
household expense items, and other nondeductible personal
expenditures which would represent items paid out as part of
taxpayers "cash flow," (e.g., Federal income taxes and insurance
premiums paid) to this "increase in net worth."
From the total amount representing increase in net worth plus
nondeductible personal expenditures, deduct all nontaxable
sources of funds, such as gifts, inheritances, income tax refunds,
the 50% tax free portion of capital gains,.etc.
Subtract the reported net income from the adjusted increase in
amount
net worth to determine the unreported income-the
7
earnings.ii
current
from
arising
presumably

The most common defenses to this form of indirect proof may be
categorized as follows:
1.

The computation failed to include assets at the beginning of the
net worth period which were sold or expended during the period
such as (a) prior accumulated funds not held in the bank account

115. Balter, supra note 15, §§ 10.4-11(4).
116. Holland, 348 U.S. at 124, 126-27.
117. See Spurgeon Avakian, Net Worth Computations as Proofof Tax Evasion,
10 TAx L. REV. 431, 442 (1955); Joseph Berman, Recent U.S., LR.S. and Tax Court
Policy on Reconstructing Net Income and Fraud Penalties, 61 DICK. L. REV. 57
(1956); Fred R. Bohlen, The Net Worth Method: How to Analyze anAgent'sFindings:
ErrorsCommonly Made: Sensitive Areas, 3 TAX'N FOR Accr. 14 (1967); Fred R.
Bohlen, LR.S. UsingNet Worth IndiscriminatelyAgainstTaxpayerswith PoorRecords,
15 J. TAX'N. 159 (1961); Thomas W. Hill, Jr., The Defense of a CriminalNet Worth
Tax Case in the Light of Recent Supreme CourtDecisions, 41 CORNELL L. REV. 106
(1955); Leshie Mills, The Net Worth Approach inDeterminingIncome, 41 VA. L. REV.
927 (1955); Wald, The Net Worth Theory in Fraud Cases, PROC. 5TH ANN. VU.
DENVER TAX'N (1955); U.S. v. William A. Massei, Annotation, Use of Net Worth
Method in Prosecutionfor Evasion of FederalIncome Tax, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1870 (1958).
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2.

(cash hoard defense)"' or (b) an asset previously purchased by
the taxpayer, held in another's name, and sold during the period.
The computation failed to take into consideration nontaxable
sources of income, such as loans from the taxpayer's family or
friends.

Most of the proof of specific items in the net worth form of analysis can
be obtained from third party sources. Of considerable importance to this
method are net worth statements filed with banks by the taxpayer himself.
Another evidentiary windfall to the Service may be the taxpayer's bankruptcy
proceedings, which can fix the crucial starting point-the opening net
worth-at zero or at a small uncomplicated sum. Bankruptcy also forecloses
argument about.prior accumulated funds. 9
The government's proof of a taxable source of income in net worth cases
generally takes the form of proof of a likely source rather than negation of all
possible sources of nontaxable income. 1" Proof of the affirmative case is
simpler and more readily understandable to a trier of fact than the proof of the
negative proposition. There are two important considerations which should
be kept in mind in dealing with problems of proof of a likely source:
1.

2.

The Government need not show that the understatement of
income is due to the probable source of income. Although the
Government frequently tries to show that the probable source is
also the source of the understated income, it is not required to do
so and evidence of the existence of a likely source is sufficient
for conviction.
While the prosecution is required to prove all elements of its
evasion case beyond reasonable doubt, the evidentiary showing
required in connection with the proof of a likely source has been
accepted by the courts in situations which might be called
121
marginal at best.

2. Bank Deposit Method
The bank deposit method is based on the premise that a taxpayer's bank
deposits most frequently represent income, and in instances when this is not
true, the taxpayer is in the best position to explain the nature of the depos1 22
its.

118. For a more detailed discussion of utilization of the cash hoard defense, see
Olyde A. Maxwell, Employing the Cash HoardDefense Against a Net Worth Fraud
Determination, 44 J. TAX'N 86 (1976).
119. Crowley, supra note 61, at 20.
120. United States v. Massei, 355 U.S. 595 (1958); United States v. Tolbert, 406
F.2d 81 (7th Cir. 1969); Lenske v. United States, 383 F.2d 20 (9th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Moody, 371 F.2d 688 (6th Cir. 1967); United States v. Vardine, 305 F.2d 60
(2d Cir. 1962); Mighell v. United States, 233 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1951); United States
v. Dong, 293 F. Supp. 1249 (D. Ariz. 1969), aff'd, 436 F.2d 123? (9th Cir. 1971).
121. Roberts & Riley, supra note 2, at A-10.
122. Dillon v. United States, 218 F.2d 97, 98 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol57/iss1/8

20

19921

CRIMINAL TAX FRAUD
Knight and Knight: Knight: Criminal Tax Fraud
The pure bank deposit method requires that the taxpayer have some
potential source of income and be making deposits into a bank account or
accounts. The total of such deposits is computed for the tax period in
question to determine gross income. Then, an adjustment is made in the total
deposits to eliminate the inclusion of non-income items, such as gifts, loans,
redeposits, bank transfers, and amounts earned in pre-prosecution years.
Finally, credit is given for ascertainable expenses, deductions, and exemptions m
The bank deposit method is generally used where the taxpayer's books
and records are inadequate or nonexistent, the taxpayer refuses to make his
records available, or where he uses the bank deposits method to prepare his
returns. However, the government is not required to prove that the taxpayer's
books and records are inaccurate as a prerequisite to the use of the bank
deposit method. 24
The same defenses used against the net worth method are available
here."~ In addition, the taxpayer may prove that he had no interest in the
particular bank in question, particularly if the account was a joint account used
by the taxpayer and others.
3. Expenditures Method
The expenditures method, sometimes referred to as the net worth and
expenditures method, is a variation of the net worth method used to prove
income from circumstantial evidence. The method was described in United
26
as follows:
States v. Caserta1
It starts with an appraisal of the taxpayer's net worth situation at the
beginning of a period. He may have much or he may have nothing. If,
during that period, his expenditures have exceeded the amount he has
returned as income and his net worth at the end of the period is the same
as it was at the beginning (or any difference accounted for) then it may be
concluded that his income tax return shows less income than he has in fact
received. Of course it is necessary, so far as possible, to negative
127
nontaxable receipts by the taxpayer during the period in question.
The expenditures method also requires a net worth analysis. However,
in the expenditure method the net worth determination is not used to calculate
income; rather, it is used to show the resources available to the taxpayer for'

906 (1955).
123. Gleckman v. United States, 80 F.2d 394, 397 (8th Cir. 1935), cert. denied,
297 U.S. 707 (1936); United States v. Frank, 151 F. Supp. 866, 868-69 (W.D. Pa.
1956), aff'd, 245 F.2d 284 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 819 (1957).
124. Bostwick v. United States, 218 F.2d 790 (5th Cir. 1955).
125. United States v. Ramsdell, 450 F.2d 130 (10th Cir. 1971).
126. 199 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1952).
127. Id. at 907.
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expenditures." Income is calculated from the excess of expenditures over
available resources.
The expenditures method is generally more appropriate than the net worth
method in situations where the taxpayer consumes his income instead of
channeling it into investments or tangible property.1 29 In such a situation,
the expenditures method is a simpler case for the prosecution to present since
assets and liabilities that do not change during the prosecution period can be
eliminated from the expenditures statement used as a trial exhibit. The
prosecution can then emphasize the expenditures without being burdened with
the complexities of net worth changes.
For reasons not given, the "Handbook for Special Agents" states that the
Department of Justice with "rare exceptions" prefers the net worth method and
advises agents to include a proof of income by the net worth method along
with expenditures proof so that the trial attorney can make the final decision
as to the method used.130
4. Key to Proving Deficiency
Regardless of the method employed by the Government, the most
significant source of proof is the information supplied by the taxpayer himself.
His prior returns provide key admissions with respect to his financial
condition. Leads supplied to agents often provide crucial evidence which
would not otherwise be developed. Most often the taxpayer will not be
represented by counsel in 'the early stages of the investigation and will be
anxious to cooperate with the agents. Evasion cases are often lost at this stage
of the proceedings, long before the trial and before retention of counsel.
Prompt and effective assertion of the taxpayer's rights to withhold information
from the agents may be the only way to prevent proof of evasion by the
Government.

IV. KEY DEVELOPMENTS
Fraud is not defined in either the Code or the Regulations. One
longstanding judicial definition of fraud describes it as "actual, intentional
wrongdoing ... the intent required is the specific purpose to evade a tax
believed to be owing.' 31 This definition has been expanded to include acts
that are done without a "bad or evil purpose." In United States v. Pomponio,
the Supreme Court held that "willfulness," which is a crucial element of fraud,
is present when the taxpayer's actions constitute "a voluntary, intentional
32
violation of a known legal duty.'
There have been no significant legislative changes in the criminal tax
fraud area since the 1950's. But, as previously noted, there have been many
128. 13 AM. JUR. Trials § 65 (1967).
129. See, e.g., Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d 558, 562 (1st Cir. 1968),
aff'd, 394 U.S. 316 (1969).
130. Manual, supra note 62, § 325.3(2).
131. Mitchell v. Commissioner, 118 F.2d 308, 310 (5th Cir. 1941).
132. United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976).
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significant developments which stem from administrative attitudes and court
decisions. The most important developments and the problems which have
been raised may be listed as follows:
1.

newI meaning of willfulness for tax felonies and misdemeanors; 13

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.

1
successful and unsuccessful use of plea bargaining;'
new interpretations of IRS responsibility in investigation
procedures including:
a. special agents warnings
b. limits on use of summonses
c. limits on use of search warrants;"
further weaknesses in the accountant privilege armor;'m
increasing limits placed on privilege against self-incrimination;137
1
effective use of the fifth amendment as a defensive weapon; 3
effective
use of the sixth amendment as a defensive weap139
on.

A. New Concept of Willfulness
Conviction in any of the principal tax crimes, including both felonies and
misdemeanors, requires that the Service prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant (taxpayer) acted "willfully."'
The Supreme Court has
observed that Congress included this element in the tax crimes to ensure that
a person would not "become a criminal by his mere failure to measure up to
the prescribed standard of conduct."''" In language that would bedevil the
court for years thereafter, the Murdock Court further stated that "willfully"
usually means "an act done with a bad purpose; without justifiable excuse;
42
stubbornly, obstinately, perversely ... or with bad faith or evil intent."'
Ten years later, the Court in Spies v. United States,4 3 stated that the term
willfulness connotes "evil motive and want of justification."'" Thirty years
after Spies, in 1973, the Supreme Court was still referring to the willfulness
requirement in terms of bad purpose or evil motive. In United States v.

133. See infra notes 140-218 and accompanying text for a discussion of this area.
134. See infra notes 219-232 and accompanying text for a discussion of this area.
135. See infra notes 233-273 and accompanying text for a discussion of this area.
136. See infra notes 274-287 and accompanying text for a discussion of this area.
137. See infra notes 288-302 and accompanying text for a discussion of this area.
138. See infra notes 303-306 and accompanying text for a discussion of this area.
139. See infra notes 307-310 and accompanying text for a discussion of this area.
140. United States v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346 (1973); Sansone v. United States, 334
F.2d 287 (8th Cir. 1964); United States v. Beck, 59-2 U.S.T.C. para. 9486 (W.D.
Wash. 1959), rev'd in part and affd in part, 298 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1962).
141. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 396 (1933) (citations omitted).
142. Id. at 394-398.
143. 317 U.S. 492 (1943).
144. Id. at 498.
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Bishop,145 the Court stated that it "shall continue to require, in both tax
felonies and tax misdemeanors that must be done 'willfully,' the bad purpose
or evil motive described in Murdock.'' 46 Precisely what is meant by the
term, and whether it might mean different things in different contexts, has
been a continuing puzzle for the courts.
Because it involves the defendant's state of mind, willfulness must
ordinarily be proven by circumstantial evidence. Its existence is a question
of fact for the jury. 47 Typically, those with actual information about the
alleged crime will not confess or assist
in the prosecution, thus necessitating
148
the use of circumstantial evidence.
The complexity of the tax laws and the human tendency to make errors
require that our society impose some sort of buffer between taxpayers and the
threat of a prison sentence. The buffer provided by Congress is the willfulness requirement, which shields from conviction those who make innocent or
even negligent errors, or who genuinely misunderstood the law.
The constitutionality of the criminal sections of the Code, via their
overlapping tendency, has been the subject of attack in a number of cases.
However, taxpayers have presented desultory arguments lacking any
persuasive reasoning. Responding in kind, judicial decisions have been
tolerant but cursory in striking down every challenge. Until recently, the
courts have continually avowed that there is no overlap in the penal laws by
distinguishing between the degree of proof of willfulness required for a felony
and that required for a misdemeanor.14 9 In United States v. Bishop,150
however, the Supreme Court stated that the definition of willfulness is uniform
in all the offenses included in sections 7201-7207.'
Obviously, this ruling
will affect both the prosecution and the defense.
1. Background of Bishop Case
Cecil J. Bishop, a California lawyer, was convicted of violating section
7206(1) which provides that anyone who
[w]illfully makes and subscribes any return ...which contains or is
verified by a written declaration that is made under the penalties of pejury,

145. 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
146. Id. at 361.
147. United'States v. Snider, 502 F.2d 645 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v.
McCorkle, Jr., 510 F.2d 565 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Bengimina, 495 F.2d
211 (8th Cir. 1974); Cooley v. United States, 501 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1974); United
States v. Ducharme, 505 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1974); United States v. Hawk, 497 F.2d
365 (9th Cir. 1974).
148. In this respect, the 1989 prosecution and conviction of Leona Helmsley,
aided largely by testimony of former employees, is somewhat unique.
149. See Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965); Spies v. United
States, 317 U.S. 492, 497 (1943); United States v. Schipani, 362 F.2d 825, 831 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934, vacated, 385 U.S. 372 (1966).
150. 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
151. Id. at 361.
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matter... shall be guilty of a felony ....12
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Bishop had taken improper deductions on his 1963, 1964, and 1965
income tax returns amounting to more than $45,000.153 His defense was
that he had only failed to check the returns for accuracy after his office
He contended that the kind of willfulness
secretary had prepared them.'
with which he had acted involved no more than gross negligence or
carelessness and thus could not have risen to the level of bad faith or evil
motive required to establish a felony.'55 6On that basis, he requested a jury
instruction for a lesser-included-offense5
A lesser-included-offense instruction is appropriate if
1.
2.

some of the elements of the crime charged also constitute a
lesser offense; and
to convict of the greater crime the jury must find a disputed
material element not necessary to convict of the lesser.

And here Bishop contended that the lesser offense was a violation of a
misdemeanor statute, section 7207. According to Bishop, the disputed element
was the degree of scienter necessary to constitute a willful violation. His
proposed instructions would have afforded the jury a choice between a
based on caprice or careless disregard and a felony based on evil
misdemeanor
7
1
purpose.
The district court refused Bishop's requested instructions and charged the
jury only on the felony, instructing it to determine whether the defendant
intended to disobey or disregard the law "with evil motive or bad purpose."'5 8 On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
and declared: "Under the evidence presented, the elements of the two offenses

Id. at 347-48.
Id. at 349-50.
Id. at 350.
Id. at 350-51.
156. Id. at 350. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(c) provides: "The defendant may be found'
guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charges ......
There are two approaches to the instruction. The common law formulation
requires that all the elements of the lesser crime be present in the greater, so that it
would never be possible to commit the greater without also having committed the
lesser offense. CHARLES WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL
2D, § 515 (1969). The more recent interpretation requires only that the facts adduced
to prove the greater offense should also be proved a related lesser offense; under this
approach inclusion is allowed even if some elements of the lesser crime are not found
in the crime. See United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314, 317 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
The Government in Bishop chose the common law formulation of the lesserincluded offense rule. Bishop argued that his requested instruction was warranted by
either the Government's chosen approach or the more modem interpretation. Bishop,
412 U.S. at 350, 361.
157. Bishop, 412 U.S. at 350-51.
158. Id. at 351.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1992

25

200

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 57, Iss. 1 [1992], Art. 8

are the same, with the exception of the element of willfulness."'' 9 The
Government's petition for certiorari was granted because of a divergence
among the circuits regarding the meaning of willfulness to be applied in
criminal tax cases. 160
The Supreme Court upheld the district court's refusal to give the
requested instruction and remanded to the court of appeals for consideration
of other issues it had not reached.' 6 ' The court held that the standard of
willfulness is the same in both felony and misdemeanor statutes in the
criminal tax area. 2 The court did not expound on the meaning of willfulness except to state that it implies "a voluntary, intentional violation of a
known legal duty"'63 and that it requires "bad purpose or evil motive."'"
Bishop advanced two arguments in favor of interpreting misdemeanor
willfulness to require something less than the bad purpose or evil motive
required in felony cases. First, such a standard would be consistent with that
traditionally required for "other purely statutory misdemeanors, since
willfulness is typically treated as meaning 'intentional' in crimes which do not
involve moral turpitude."'"
Bishop's second argument concerned the
potential overlap between tax felony and tax misdemeanor statutes which
would yield an arguable result from a uniform definition of willfulness.
Bishop contended that "but for" a variation in the level of willfulness, sections
7206(1) and 7207 would be exact duplicates inthe area of income tax returns.
The Court in the past has responded to such claims of overlap by initially
assuming that Congress would not create criminal statutes that are identical
as to the elements of the offense but that vary as to penalty.'6 At the same
time, the Court has always recognized that some criminal tax statutes are
specific and thus may be included within other more general ones."6 Even
so, the Court has been more willing to find a complete overlap of statutes on
a given state of facts than to define willfulness as a variable.10
In Bishop, the Court took the position that tax statutes with otherwise
distinguishable elements do not overlap merely because they share a common
element of willfulness. "Congress distinguished the statutes," observed the
court, "in ways that do not turn on the meaning of the word 'willfully.' 69
In general, felonies are differentiated from misdemeanors by the "additional
misconduct" required for felonies. Accordingly, the Court in this case found

159. United States v. Bishop 455 F.2d 612,614 (9th Cir.), cert. granted,409 U.S.
841 (1972), rev'd, 412 U.S. 346 (1973).
160. Bishop, 412 U.S. at 348.
161. Id. at 349.
162. Id. at 361.
163. Id. at 360.
164. Id. at 361.
165. RoLLINS M. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 780 (2d ed. 1969).
166. Achilli v. United States, 353 U.S. 373, 378-79 (1957); Berra v. United
States, 351 U.S. 131, 133-34 (1956).
167. Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965).
168. Id.
169. Bishop, 412 U.S. at 358.
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various grounds on which to differentiate
the sections wholly in terms of
170
elements other than willfulness.
2. Definition of Willfulness
Thus, after Bishop, the definition of willfulness is uniform-with the
exception of frivolous positions-in all the offenses included in sections 72017207. In order to establish that a violation is willful, the Government must
prove:
1.
2.
3.

a legal duty,
knowledge of that duty, and
a violation of the duty which is voluntary and intentional.'

In addition, the Court in Bishop declared that it will continue to require, in
both tax felonies and tax misdemeanors that must be done 'willfully,' the bad
purpose or evil motive described in Murdock.1' 2 In that case, the taxpayer
refused to supply information in violation of the predecessor to section
7203173 and invoked his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination in
good faith but without legal grounds. 74 His failure to supply information
was held not willful.175
The requirement of bad purpose or evil motive in order to establish
willfulness is considered objectionable by one author for two reasons:
1.

2.

The Government, in order to prove an element of the offense,
and the defendant, in order to fashion his defense, would have
to develop standards by which to separate good purposes or
motives from evil ones.
Neither Bishop nor Murdock indicated whether bad purpose or
evil motive refers to the immediate intent or, instead to an
ultimate goal.... If the Bishop Court is directing the lower
courts to focus on motive in order to identify willfulness, it has
created an element of tax offense which is almost unsusceptible
76
of proof.1
3. Immediate Effects of Bishop

A:s a result of the Bishop concept of willfulness, a lesser-included
instruction is not available to defendants where the degree of willfulness is the
only disputed element of the offense charged. Juries, deprived of the option

170. Id. at 356-58.
171. Id. at 360.
172. Bishop, 412 U.S. at 361 (citing United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389
(1933)).
173. Internal Revenue Act of 1928, Sec. 146(9).
174. United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 391, 397 (1933).
175. Id. at 396-98.
176. Diana S. Donaldson, Meaning of Willfulness for Tax Felonies and
Misdemeanors,35 OHIo ST. L.J. 229, 235 (1974).
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of finding the accused guilty of a lesser crime, may be forced to grant felony
convictions in cases which involve only a minimal degree of willfulness.
The failure of Bishop to dispel the confusion surrounding the meaning of
willfulness is indicated by subsequent appellate court opinions which either
have ignored the requirement of bad purpose or evil motive,1" or have paid
lip service to reciting the words without elaboration.17 The deficiencies in
the opinion are unfortunate because the general criminal law has in the past
borrowed its definition of willfulness from criminal tax cases. 179 The
suggestion which emanates from Bishop that motive is intrinsic to willfulness
could have far-reaching effects.1 80
B. New Interpretationof Willfulhess for Tax ProtestSuits: Cheek
In United States v. Cheek,'8 a decision that may have major implications for future tax protest suits, the Supreme Court held that a good-faith
misunderstanding of the law or a good-faith belief that one is not violating the
law negates the willfulness element of a tax evasion charge, regardless of
whether the claimed misunderstanding or belief is objectively reasonable. This
Supreme Court decision will allow evidence of a defendant's view of the tax
system, in spite of any or all appearances of unreasonableness, to go to the
jury for consideration of the willfulness of an evasion of taxes. Prior to this
decision, a good faith misunderstanding or belief had to be objectively
reasonable and the tax evasion could not be based on constitutionality
issues.' 8
1. Facts of Cheek
The taxpayer was a pilot for a major airline. Through 1979, he filed his
income tax returns, but thereafter ceased to file. Also, for the years 1981
through 1984, he indicated on his forms W-4 that he was exempt from federal
taxes. The taxpayer was indicted for 10 federal violations of federal tax law,
including willfully failing to file federal tax returns183 and willfully evading
income taxes.'8 These tax offenses are specific-intent crimes requiring that
the defendant acted willfully.
In the district court, the government showed that the taxpayer was
involved in at least four civil cases challenging various aspects of the federal

177. United States v. Andros, 484 F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1973).
178. United Statcs v. DiVarco, 484 F.2d 670,673-75 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 916 (1974).
179. See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 101 (1945); United States v.
Illinois Cent. R.R., 303 U.S. 239, 242 (1938).
180. For example, the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77X (1971) and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 ff (1971) require a willful violation.
181. 882 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. granted 443 U.S. 1068 (1990), vacated
111 S. Ct. 604 (1991).
182. See United States v. Buckner, 830 F.2d 102, 103 (7th Cir. 1987).
183. I.R.M. § [7203] (1987).
184. I.R.M. § [72011 (1987).
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income tax system. He also belonged to a group that believes the federal tax
system is unconstitutional. Testifying in his own defense, the taxpayer stated
that he sincerely believed that the tax laws were unconstitutionally enforced
against him, that his wages were not subject to taxation and that his non-filing
was lawful. He argued that he had acted without the willfulness required for
criminal conviction. The district court judge, in his instructions, advised the
jury that, in order to prove "willfulness," the government must prove the
voluntary and intentional violation of a known legal duty, a burden that could
not be proved by showing mistake, ignorance, or negligence. He further
advised that an objectively reasonable good-faith misunderstanding or belief
of the law would negate willfulness, but that mere disagreement with the law
would not. After the jury indicated that it could not reach a verdict, the judge
further instructed the jury that an honest but an unreasonable belief is not a
defense and does not negate willfulness. The jury found the taxpayer guilty
on all counts, based on a lack of finding the taxpayer's good-faith misunderstandings and beliefs objectively reasonable.'85 On appeal to the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the taxpayer argued that the district court
erred by instructing the jury that only an objectively reasonable misunderstanding of the law negates the statutory willfulness requirement. The Seventh
Circuit upheld the conviction as it agreed that the taxpayer's good-faith
misunderstanding of the law was not objectively reasonable. 1' In prior cases,
the Seventh Circuit had clarified that good-faith misunderstanding of the law
negates willfulness only if the defendant's beliefs are objectively reasonable. 87
Because the Seventh Circuit's interpretation of "willfully" conflicted with that
of other courts of appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.

2. What Determines Willfulness
In Cheek, the Supreme Court traced the evolution of the standard for the
statutory willfulness requirement from the common-law. general rule that
ignorance or mistake of the law is no defense to the present situation where
willfulness is the voluntary, intentional violation of a known duty." s
The Court noted that, in a criminal case, as presently construed, the
willfulness standard, requires the government to prove that the defendant was
aware of the duty at issue.'89 This awareness cannot be found if the jury
accepts a good-faith misunderstanding and belief submission by the defendant. 19
In this decision, the Supreme Court added that the jury may
consider the claim regardless of whether the misunderstanding or belief is

185. Cheek v. United States, No. 82 C 2304 (N.D. Ill. March 8, 1984) (per
curiam).
186. Cheek v. United States, 882 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1989).
187. United States v. Bressler, 772 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1985).
188. Cheek v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 604 (1991). See, e.g., United States v.
Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10 (1976) (per curiam) ; Bishop v. United States, 412 U.S. 346
(1973).
189. Cheek, 111 S. Ct. at 610.
190. Id. at 611.
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objectively reasonable. 91' In this case, the taxpayer's claims that he was not
a person required to file, a return or pay taxes and that wages are not taxable
should have gone to the jury without instructions limiting their potential
persuasiveness." The jury could determine the sincerity and credibility of
these good-faith claims through other admissible evidence.'
The Court
explained that knowledge and belief are questions for the fact finder.194 The
characterization of a particular belief as not objectively reasonable transforms
the inquiry into a legal one and would prevent the jury from hearing it. 195
Additionally, the Court asserted that forbidding the jury to consider evidence
pertaining to the taxpayer's good-faith beliefs that could negate willfulness
would raise a serious issue under the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provisions.'
The taxpayer also maintained that he believed in good faith that the
income tax law was unconstitutional as applied to him and, thus, could not
1
legally impose a duty on him of which he would have been aware. 9
According to the Court, claims involving the constitutionality of a tax
provision reveal full knowledge of the law at issue and a studied conclusion
that the provisions are invalid and unenforceable. 9 8 Such a mind-set,
reasoned the Court, indicates a voluntary and intentional violation of a known
duty and would not negate the willfulness requirement.'" Therefore, the
Court concluded that a defendant's views about the validity of tax statutes (1)
are irrelevant to the issue of willfulness, (2) need not be heard by the jury, and
(3) if heard, an instruction to disregard would be proper.200
Accordingly, the Supreme Court decided that the district judge did not
err when instructing the jury to disregard the taxpayer's claims that the tax
laws were unconstitutional. 20' However, it was an error for the court to
instruct the jury to disregard the taxpayer's asserted beliefs that wages were
not income and that he was not a taxpayer within the meaning of the Code
when the jury was determining the willfulness of the taxpayer's actions.2°
In his concurrence, Justice Scalia agreed with the judgment only.203 He
questioned the possibility that a belief in the nonexistence of a textual
prohibition may excuse liability, while a belief in the invalidity of a textual
prohibition will not excuse liability and cannot even be considered. 2 4 He
asserted that the new interpretation of a willful violation being established by

191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 612.
Id. at 612-13.
Id.
Id. at 613.
Id.
Id.
Id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id.
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full knowledge and a studied conclusion may impose criminal sanctions on
those who find incompatibilities between Treasury regulations and the Code,
Treasury rulings and the regulations, or even IRS auditor pronouncements and
Treasury rulings.'
In their dissent, Justices Blackmun and Marshall (Justice Souter did not
participate) found the district court's instruction requiring an objectivelyreasonable good-faith belief to be an additional protection for the taxpayer and
an additional hurdle for the prosecution. 2°6 The new interpretation of
willfulness broke down that additional wall. Additionally, these Justices
maintain that this opinion will encourage taxpayers to cling to frivolous views
of the law in hope of convincing a jury of their sincerity. 2° In their view,
this decision may have gone beyond the limits of common sense.
3. The Impact of Cheek for the Future
While added frivolous claims may enter the court system under this
broader interpretation of willfulness, a jury will still have the final say on how
sincere a taxpayer's beliefs are when weighed against the alleged reasonableness of the asserted good-faith beliefs. However, many tax protest cases
revolve around constitutional issues, an aspect the Court appears to have left
untouched. Moreover, it should be noted that the decision affects criminal
cases only. Civil sanctions are still available to collect back taxes, interest
and penalties. Issues raised by this decision will eventually work their way
through the court system and lend guidance for determining the acceptability
and accessibility of tax protests suits.

4. Future Effects of Bishop
According to one author, Bishop can be read to support three contradictory positions:
1.

2.

3.

205.
206.
207.
208.

The Court may have intended to make motive an element of
every tax offense requiring willfulness. If so, the prosecutorial
burden will be extremely heavy and valid defenses will abound.
The prosecution does not have to prove motive, but defenses
based on lack of bad purpose or evil motive will be available.
Defenses of this type were frequently, asserted before Bishop
without success, and their fate after Bishop is examined below.
[l'here is] an equivalence between motive and intent so that
proof of an intentional violation of a known duty suffices to
establish willfulness. Interpreted thus, the words "bad purpose
or evil motive" add nothing of substance to the definition of
willfulness. 2°

Id
Id. at 615 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id.
Donaldson, supra note 176, at 235.
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The existence of three defensible characterizations of Bishop complicates
analysis of the results of the case. However, given that knowledge is now the
minimum possible scienter requirement for willfulness, and that this level of
scienter is uniform in tax felonies and misdemeanors, one can speculate as to
probable effects of Bishop.
5. Limitations of Bishop
In 1976, the Supreme Court ended the confusion caused by the early and
continuing references to bad purpose and evil motive. Simply put, the issue
was whether proof of a specific intent to violate the law was sufficient, or
whether the jury was required to find that the taxpayer acted with bad purpose
or evil motive. In United States v. Pomponio,20 a per curiam decision, the
Court seemed surprised that lower courts were requiring a finding of bad
purpose or evil motive. The Court stated that the lower courts "incorrectly
assumed that the reference to an 'evil motive' in United States v. Bishop and
prior cases meant something more than the specific intent to violate the law
...
.,1,210 The Court then stated the meaning of the term in language that
remains the standard definition: willfulness "simply means a voluntary,
211
intentional violation of a known legal duty.
Although courts and commentators still refer to the evil motive or bad
purpose requirement, it is important to recognize that these terms are
illustrative and do not impose any additional proof requirement. Thus, a jury
finding that a defendant acted with an evil motive is tantamount to the
ultimate finding of willfulness; on the other hand, a jury can find that a
defendant acted willfully without finding that he acted with a bad purpose or
evil motive. In other words, although a voluntary and intentional violation of
a known legal duty may reflect a bad purpose or evil motive, the Service need
not prove, and the jury need not find, both the specific intent to violate the
law and evil motive or bad purpose. Moreover, the Supreme Court has ruled
that the Bishop concept of willfulness is no longer applicable to criminal
prosecution for frivolous positions (as previously discussed).
6. Effect on Governmental Prosecution
As previously mentioned in Section II, a major purpose of criminal tax
prosecution is deterrence of potential future violators. To that effect, possible
cases undergo a screening procedure within the Treasury Department to insure
that only cases with an excellent chance of conviction are prosecuted. For
example, in 1971, 72 million returns out of over 113 million were mathematically verified, and the Intelligence Division forwarded to the Justice
Department for prosecution only 1,021 income tax and miscellaneous criminal
tax cases.212

209.
210.
211.
212.

429 U.S. 10 (1976) (per curiam).
Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
McCALL, THE DIMENSIONS OF TAX FRAUD, (1973).
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Will this small number of cases decrease further in view of the fact that
a showing of caprice or careless disregard will no longer be sufficient to
establish a willful misdemeanor? It is difficult to determine how the greater
burden of proof will affect government prosecutors, though they have long
been faced with an identical burden in felony cases. It at least seems safe to
predict that if the taxpayer is disreputable and there exists clear proof of a
repetitive pattern of evasion, Treasury officials will recommend criminal
prosecution notwithstanding lack of convincing proof of willfulness."
These considerations may mitigate the effect of Bishop on misdemeanor
prosecutions.
One provision which may be seriously affected by a more stringent
scienter requirement for willful misdemeanors is the "failure to file" charge,
the only really viable part of section 7203. Speculation has been that "[as]
data processing becomes more effective, it is likely that failure to file cases
will be on the increase."2" 4 Despite this trend, the government, after Bishop
and Cheek, may be reluctant to recommend prosecution under section 7203
unless it can prove a repetitive pattern of failure to file and the taxpayer is not
the sort likely to elicit sympathy from a jury as to willfulness.215
7. Effect on Defendants
A taxpayer who is unfortunate enough to become a defendant may be
benefitted by a greater range of possible defenses if Bishop has added motive
to the elements of tax offenses or at least allowed benevolent motives as an
independent defense. For example, the defense of emotional disturbance is
After Bishop, a,
often used by defendants and rarely accepted by courts. 216AfeBihpa
defendant's showing that he is incapable of forming the requisite evil motive

213. Baiter, supra note 15, at § 13.3.
214. Jackson L. Boughner, How PractitionersShould Handle Willful Failureto
File Cases, 32 J. TAX'N. 46 (1970).
215. The filing of purported "returns" that lack sufficient information to permit
determination of the tax due does not constitute the filing of a "return," and the
protestor can be prosecuted under Section 7203 and assessed civil penalties for
delinquent filing. See, e.g., United States v. Daly, 481 F.2d 28 (8th Cir. 1973) (upheld
a section 7203 conviction against a person whose "return" contained only demographic

information and documents questioning the constitutionality of the tax laws).
Similarly, United States v. Vance, 730 F.2d 736 (11th Cir. 1984) shows that a return
that simply identifies the taxpayer and makes a blanket "fifth amendment" claim is not
a "return," or a valid assertion of the fifth amendment protection against selfincrimination. However, United States v. Edwards, 777 F.2d 644 (11th Cir. 1985)
shows to avoid the "no return" problem and at the same time validly invoke the fifth
amendment, the claim must be made as to only specified types of questions, such as
the source of the taxpayer's income, and the return must otherwise be correct and

complete.
216. See United States v. Bernabei 473 F.2d 1385, 1385 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 825 (1973); United States v. Haseltine, 419 F.2d 579, 581 (9th Cir. 1969);
United States v. Fancy, 411 F.2d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 957
(1969); United States v. Levy, 326 F. Supp. 1285, 1294, 1298 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 449
F.2d 769 (2d Cir. 1971).
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for conviction may be a valid defense. 1 7 Similarly, an intent to comply in
the future may be an acceptable defense as showing lack of bad purpose or
evil motive. A mistaken belief, albeit held perversely in the face of
contradictory information, may now provide a defense even if motive is not
considered an element, because it vitiates the knowledge or intent required for
willful violation. In short, any explanation which is a believable alternative
to a bad purpose or evil motive could conceivably defeat the criminal charge
if motive is an element of defense.218
Although Bishop for the most part seems to aid defendants, it saddles
them with at least one clear disadvantage: the unavailability of a lesserincluded-offense instruction when all the elements of the greater offense
except willfulness are clearly proved. On the other hand, if the government's
proof of willfulness after Bishop is doubtful enough to have warranted a
lesser-included-offense instruction under the disapproved felony-misdemeanor
willfulness dichotomy, that weakness should now warrant acquittal because the
proof of willfulness would necessarily be inadequate to sustain a misdemeanor
conviction. Logically, Bishop leaves the defendant's position either unchanged or strengthened as regards the effect of the government's failure to
meet the willfulness test.
In actuality, this must not be the case; otherwise, Bishop would not have
appealed the district court's refusal of the lesser-included-offense instruction.
Apparently, providing a jury with an alternative offense on which to convict,
even one much less severe than that charged, increases the chance of a finding
that the government failed to establish the requisite degree of willfulness for
a felony conviction. If the only alternative is to acquit altogether, the jury is
probably more hesitant to find insufficient the government's proof of
willfulness. If this analysis is correct, to deny defendants a lesser-includedoffense instruction on willfulness as a variable is to increase the chances of
a felony conviction on a tenuous showing of willfulness.
C. Plea Bargaining
Closely akin to the lesser-included-offense problems discussed above is
the use of plea bargaining. Baiter describes this as the "tax fraud syndrome"
due to the ironic results of a taxpayer violating both a misdemeanor and a
felony section.219

217. But see Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 353-54 (1965) (defense of
emotional disturbance held insufficient); United States v. Edwards, 375 F.2d 862, 867
(9th Cir. 1967) (same).
218. E.g., Martin v. United States, 317 F.2d 753 (9th Cir. 1963) (the belief that
income as low as $1,500 does not trigger the obligation to file income tax returns);
Abdul v. United States 254 F.2d 292, 293 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 832
(1960) (the belief that the filing of a return must be accompanied by payment of the
tax); Ripperger v. United States, 248 F.2d 944, 945 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 940 (1958) (same).
219. Harry G. Baiter, "PleaBargaining" and the "Tax Fraud"Syndrome, 52
TAXEs 333, 333-36 (1974).
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1. Meaning of Plea Bargaining
At one time, plea bargaining in the tax fraud area meant that the taxpayer
who was ready to "call it quits" would be allowed by the U.S. Attorney to
plead "guilty" to the principal felony count in a multi-count indictment
(assuming it contained a felony count), with the understanding that the
remaining counts would be dismissed.? Next, it became popular for plea
bargaining to be based on the defendant's agreement to plead nolo contendere
(no contest) to one or more counts of a multi-count indictment if the rest of
the counts were dismissed.2'
Today, the concept has progressed even
further, primarily due to the emergence of the following factors:
1.

2.

agreement by government prosecutors to grant partial (bringing
fewer criminal charges than they could on the evidence available), or total immunity, in return for the potential defendant's
testimony against others; and
agreement by prosecutors to aceept a plea of guilty or (more
often) "no contest" to a misdemeanor charge rather than to a
felony charge (which either is part of a multi-count indictment,
or was to have been included in the charges actually
brought).222
2. Ironic Effects of New Factors

The latter of these two developments brings to the fore some interesting
considerations in light of the Supreme Court decision in Bishop. Since the
degree of willfulness required for a conviction of a misdemeanor charge is
probably identical to that required in a felony charge, it is doubtful that a
prison sentence meted out on a plea of guilty or no contest, or after a finding
of guilty by a court or a jury, on a felony count would exceed that imposed
on a misdemeanor count.
If this is the case, then there must be other motivating forces which cause
the taxpayer to often hold out for a plea to a misdemeanor rather than to a
more clearly applicable felony count. Baiter suggests the following concepts
as the more obvious motivating forces:
1.

2.

The relative impact of a misdemeanor versus felony conviction
on suspension or disbarment in the case of a defendant who is
a lawyer. [A]s a practical matter conviction on a misdemeanor
charge is more likely to result in a more favorable disposition
than would result from conviction in a felony charge.
The relative impact of the felony versus misdemeanor conviction
vis-a-vis obtaining or retention of state licenses required of
defendants who are not lawyers, but must have a state license in
order to earn a livelihood, e.g., physicians, dentists, optometrists,

220. See Schmidt, supra note 88, at 299.
221. Id.
222. Balter, supra note 15, at § 13.3.
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contractors, plumbers, electricians, and innumerable others who

3.
4.

are engaged in professions, trades or businesses.
The relative impact of a misdemeanor versus felony conviction
on the ability of the defendant to retain or in the future attain a
public office.
The relative impact of a felony versus a misdemeanor count visa-vis pardon, commutation of sentence, restoration of civil rights,
and similar restorative procedures, available under both federal
and state statutes. 2n

In summary then, it appears that the defendant who faces these problems
after conviction of a misdemeanor is in a far better position to achieve a
satisfactory solution than if his conviction were for a felony, regardless of the
imprisonment, if any, actually meted out. Moreover, it seems that the
taxpayer has indeed been afforded a viable defense mechanism. However, a
review of the case law indicates that there are a few inherent dangers in plea
bargaining.
3. Case Law
-Although the "Supreme Court has unequivocally put its stamp of approval
on the 'plea-bargaining' process,"m United States v. Bednarskim demonstrates the dangers of attempting to negotiate a plea. The defendant in
Bednarski entered a guilty plea to one of six tax fraud counts in the
indictment and in response to the court's inquiries, stated that no threats or
promises had been made to elicit such plea. In fact, the U.S. attorney had
agreed to dismiss the other counts and recommended a one-month sentence
and a $1,000 fine if the defendant would plead guilty to the single count.
When the court became aware of the actual circumstances surrounding the
guilty plea, it refused to accept it. The defendant was thereupon tried, found
guilty on all six counts, and sentenced to four months imprisonment and fined
$9,000. Accordingly, the defendant attempted to establish that the court was
required to accept his initial plea of guilty. However, the court ruled that the
acceptance of a guilty plea is discretionary, not mandatory.2
Apparently, the withdrawal of a plea offers another obstacle to the
otherwise successful use of plea bargaining. The Fifth Circuit denied a
taxpayer the right to withdraw his voluntary pleas of guilty and nolo
contendere to misdemeanors since the pleas were knowingly and freely
given. 7

223. Id. at 335.
224. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757-58 (1970); Parker v. North
Carolina, 391 U.S. 790, 799 (1970); United States v. Slatko, 462 F.2d 1169, 1171 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1075 (1972) (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S.
25, 31, 37 (1970)).

225. 445 F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1971).
226. Id. at 365-66.
227. United States v. Slatko, 72-2 T.C. 9571 (1972).
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The Third Circuit has further delineated the use of plea bargaining. In
United States v. Dixon, F. Dixon," the court was critical of the district
court because it had failed to follow the procedures outlined in Paradisov.
United States,"2 an earlier decision by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
in which the same kind of problem was anticipated. 30 In Paradiso, the
court had carefully outlined a procedure to help avoid ostensible claims by
defendants of unfairness in the guilty plea process and minimize the escalating
number of cases complaining of aborted plea bargains, involuntary pleas, or
frustrated plea expectations. 1 So, in Dixon, the Third Circuit, under its
supervisory powers, instructed the district courts of the Third Circuit to
thereafter follow the procedure outlined (i.e., committing any plea bargain to
the record32 at the time of the arraignment in connection with the Rule 11
inquiry),
D. New Interpretationsof IRS Responsibility
in Investigation Procedures
Until 1969, the courts had maintained the position that the administrative
rules and procedures of the IRS were discretionary.? Therefore, actions of
the Service were not invalidated' merely because it did not comply with such
rules and procedures. However, decisions after 1969 indicate that this notion
has become academic history.
1. Special Agent Warnings
Miranda v. Arizona"2 established the principle that, under certain
circumstances, warnings had to be given by investigating agents to suspects
or targets of an investigation before they are interrogated or requested to
submit personal records. If these warnings are not given, use of a taxpayer's
statements or records will be suppressed and will be inadmissible upon trial.
The requirements of Miranda came into play during a custodial
interrogation, which was defined as one occurring after the suspect was taken
into custody "or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way.'"S If a taxpayer is in custody at the time of the interrogation, the

228. 504 F.2d 69 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 963 (1975).
229. 482 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1973).
230. Id. at 72.
231. Paradiso,482 F.2d at 413.
232. Dixon, 504 F.2d at 72.
233. Geurkink v. United States, 354 F.2d 629, 632 (7th Cir. 1965); Luihring v.
Glotzbach, 304 F.2d 560, 565 (4th Cir. 1962); Cleveland Trust Co. v. United States,
266 F. Supp. 824, 831-32 (N.D.. Ohio 1966), aft'd, 421 F.2d 475 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970); Sherwood v. United States, 246 F. Supp. 502, 503
(E.D.N.Y. 1956); Hamilton v. United States, 324 F.2d 960, 965 (Ct. Cl. 1963); Flynn
v. Commissioner, 40 T.C. 770 (1963).
234. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
235. Id. at 436-38.
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necessary warnings have to be given, whether the interrogator is a revenue
agent or a special agent.'
The Miranda warnings that must be given to a suspect include the
following:
1.
2.
3.
4.

the right to remain silent;
any statements that he makes may be used against him;
the right to counsel with an attorney prior to and during an
interrogation; and
an attorney
would be appointed for him if he could not afford
37
one.2

Most circuits which have considered the problem have held that under
ordinary circumstances interrogations by special agents are not custodial in
nature and, therefore, that Miranda warnings are not required.? 8
The Seventh Circuit, however, has held to the contrary in United States
v. Dickerson,739 which determined, in effect, that the investigation became
criminal in nature at the time the case was referred to the Intelligence
Division. However, in United States v. Waitkus240 the Seventh Circuit
refused to apply Dickerson retroactively to a special agent's interrogation
which occurred prior to the Dickerson decision. 241 Furthermore, the Seventh
Circuit in Waitkus used language which may have weakened somewhat the
thrust of the Dickerson decision:
we find no showing that defendant was in custody or was deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way at the inception of the first contact
with the special agents .... [We] see no basis for finding a denial of due
242
process to defendant.
If the problem of special agents' warnings had ended with principles
enunciated in Miranda, there would have been relative certainty in the
interpretation and application of the opinion in that case. However, the matter
was complicated by two news releases issued by the Service.

236. Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1968).
237. Miranda,389 U.S. at 444.
238. United States v. Stribling, 437 F.2d 765, 771-72 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 402
U.S. 973 (1971); United States v. Jaskiewicz, 433 F.2d 415, 420 (3d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1021 (1971); United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021, 1026-28 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); United States v. Brevik, 422 F.2d 449, 450
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 943 (1970); Simon v. United States, 421 F.2d 667,
668 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970); United States v. Caiello, 420 F.2d
471,473 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1039 (1970); Hensley v. United States,
406 F.2d 481, 484-85 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v. Bagdasian, 398 F.2d 971, 971
(4th Cir. 1968).
239. 413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).
240. 470 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973).
241. Dickerson was decided July 28, 1969.
242. Waitkus, 470 F.2d at 22.
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The news releases describe the Service procedures for protecting the
constitutional rights of persons suspected of tax fraud during all phases of its
investigations. The essence of the two news releases follows:2 3
1.

2.

News Release of 1013/67-On the initial contact the Special
Agent will introduce himself by title and state that he is investigating the possibility of criminal fraud. If the investigation goes
beyond preliminary inquiries, the Special Agent is required to
advise the taxpayer of his Constitutional rights to remain silent
and to retain counsel.
News Release of 11126168-At the initial meeting with the
taxpayer, the Special Agent will identify himself, describe his
function and give full Miranda warnings. 2"
2. Effect of Noncompliance

Two oft-cited decisions, United States v. Heffner 245 and United States
v. Leahey,1 6 have held that the failure by special agents to give the warnings prescribed by the Service requires the suppression of evidence produced
by a taxpayer.247 In Leahey, the court announced that agents of the Service
had a duty to conform to its procedures, that citizens have a right to rely on
conformance with publicized instructions, and that the courts must enforce
both the right and the duty.2 48 In Heffner, it was stated that it is of no
significance that procedures of the Service are more generous than the
Constitution requires.249
Several district courts, however, have refused to follow the HeffnerLeahey doctrine.2 0 The rationale of these decisions seems to be that the
Constitution and laws may dictate conditions for the admissibility of evidence
in a federal trial; administrative agencies may not.
Several decisions have held that substantial compliance with requirements
set forth in the news releases is all that is required; literal compliance is not
necessary.251 The First Circuit expressed a "disinclination to view an agency
as irrevocably locked into the specific verbal formulation" of a news
release. 2

243. United States v. Harary, 71-1 T.C. 9362 (1971).
244. Roberts & Riley, supra note 2, at A-21 to A-22.
245. 420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1969).
246. 434 F.2d 70 (1st Cir. 1970).
247. See, e.g., Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976); Mathis v. United
States, 391 U.S. 1 (1968).
248. Leahey, 434 F.2d at 71-72.
249. Heffner, 420 F.2d at 812.
250. See Fukushima v. United States, 372 F. Supp 212 (D. Haw. 1974); United
States v. Luna, 313 F. Supp 1294 (W.D. Tex. 1970); United States v. Middleton, 70-2
T.C. 9491 (1970).
251. United States v. Dawson 486 F.2d 1326, 1130 (5th Cir. 1973); United States
v. Bembridge, 458 F.2d 1262, 1264 (1st Cir. 1972).
252. Bembridge, 458 F.2d at 1264.
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3. Limits on Summons Enforcement
General restrictions on the enforceability of administrative summonses
were imposed by the Supreme Court in United States v. Powell.253 There,
the Court held that the Commissioner need not meet any standard of probable
cause to obtain enforcement of his summons, either before or after the
expiration of the three-year statute of limitations applicable to ordinary tax
liabilities.2 44 However, he must show that
the investigation will be conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the
inquiry may be relevant to the purpose, that the information sought is not
already within the Commissioner's possession, and that the administrative
steps required by the Code have been followed .... It is the court's
process which is invoked to enforce the administrative summons and a court
may not permit its process to be abused. Such an abuse would take place
if the summons had been issued for an improper purpose, such as to harass
the taxpayer or put pressure on him to settle a collateral dispute, or for any
other purpose reflecting on the good faith of the particular investigation.?
There is no express provision in section 7602 for the issuance of a
summons for the purpose of securing evidence for use in a criminal prosecution. On the basis of that omission, taxpayers have urged the courts to refuse
to enforce administrative summonses issued by special agents on the ground
that their function, and accordingly the purpose of the issuance of the
summonses, is the furtherance of a criminal prosecution, and therefore not
authorized under section 7602. Generally, courts have taken the position that
the functions of a special agent are dual, civil as well as criminal. Accordingly, administrative summonses have usually been enforced. z 6 The Supreme7
Court definitely settled all doubts on the matter in Couch v. United States.2
It is now undisputed that a special agent is authorized, pursuant to "Section
7602, to issue an Internal Revenue summons58 in aid of a tax investigation with
civil and possible criminal consequences. 11
The Supreme Court referred to its prior decision in United States v.
Donaldsone 9 wherein the Court had stated: "We hold that under section
7602 an Internal Revenue summons may be issued in aid of an investigation
if it is issued in good faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal
prosecution." °
As appears from the above quotations, in spite of general enforceability
of special agent summonses, there are definite restrictions upon the use of

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.

379 U.S. 48 (1964).
Id. at 57,
Id. at 57-58 (footnote omitted).
See e.g., Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 535 (1971).
409 U.S. 322 (1973).
Id. at 326.
400 U.S. 517 (1971).
Id. at 536.
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such summonses.261 For instance, in Donaldson the Court was careful to
point out that "where the sole objective of the investigation is to obtain
evidence for use in a criminal prosecution, the purpose is not a legitimate one
and enforcement may be denied." 262 The Supreme Court referred to several
cases in support of this conclusion.'
In fraud investigations involving return preparers, the use of "John Doe"
summonses by the Service has been restricted to situations involving "either
a single unidentified taxpayer or a small group of unknown taxpayers.'
According to United States v. Theodore,20 the Service is not to be given an
unrestricted license to rummage through the files of a returns preparer. In
United States. v. Bisceglia,' in which the Supreme Court first sanctioned
the use of John Doe summonses, the Service' knew only that $40,000 in
uniformly deteriorated $100 bills had been transferred to the Cincinnati
Federal Reserve bank in a one week period. The Court enforced a summons
on the transferor bank, labeled "In the matter of the tax liability of John Doe,"
to make available all its deposit records during the relevant weeks involving
deteriorated $100 bills.
Code section 7609(f) provides the rules governing "John Doe" summonses. It requires an exparte hearing prior to the service of such a summons, in
which the Service must show that:
(1) the summons relates to an ascertainable group or class of taxpayers
(e.g., buyers of a particular tax shelter offering);
(2) there is a reasonable basis for believing these persons may have failed
to comply with the tax laws; and
(3) the information sought by the summons is not readily available from
other sources. 7
Failure by the Service to establish that these criteria are satisfied should result
in a refusal by the court to enforce the summons.
In view of the foregoing, the circumstances under which section 7602

summonses are issued should be carefully scrutinized since there are situations
in which the use of such summonses is not permissible and enforcement will
not be ordered by the courts.

261. See, e.g., Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1 (1986); Beckwith v. United
States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
262. Donaldson, 400 U.S. at 533.
263. Id. at 533-34 (citing United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 851 (5th Cir.
1969); Venn v. United States, 400 F.2d 207, 210 (5th Cir. 1968); Wild v. United
States, 362 F.2d 206, 208-09 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp.
248 (D. Mass. 1953)).
264. United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749, 754 (4th Cir. 1973); compare
United States v. Carter, 489 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1974).
265. 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973).
266. 420 U.S. 141 (1975), reh'g, 486 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1973). Compare the
limitation in Bisceglia with the language of Code section 7609(f) (added by the 1976
Tax Act).
267. I.R.C. § 7609(l) (1988).
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4. Limit on Use of Search Warrant
In Warden v. Hayden,m the Supreme Court departed from the
longstanding principle that search warrants were authorized only to seize the
instrumentalities and fruits of crime or contraband, but not mere evidence of
a crime. The Seventh Circuit in Hill v. Philpolt,269 and the Ninth Circuit in
Vonder Ahe v. Howland,270 have held that searches and seizures of taxpayer's records, pursuant to search warrants, violated their privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. The search
warrant procedure was considered as compulsory a method of obtaining these
records as a subpoena requiring the taxpayer to produce them. Both courts
rejected the government's argument that "once the validity of a search is
established under theFourth Amendment-and by that fact alone-the Fifth
Amendment is not and cannot be violated."2 71
The Sixth Circuit reached a contrary conclusion in United States v.
BlanA72 as it specifically rejected the rationale of Hill and concluded that
the search warrant involved no element of compulsion as a subpoena would.
However, it is noted that the records seized were bookmaking records which
even prior to Warden, would probably have been considered instrumentalities
of the crime, rather than mere evidence thereof.
In United States v. Rajewick273 a conviction for attempted tax evasions
was affirmed in spite of the use of a search warrant and the seizure of
documents. However, it appears that the documents seized were corporate
records which could have been subpoenaed and would not have been protected
by a claim of the Fifth Amendment, so that the rationale of Hill and Vonder
Ahe is inapplicable.
Consequently, if search warrants should be used in a tax fraud investigation, the teachings of Hill and VonderAhe should be kept in mind. There is
a distinct probability that the use of records of an individual taxpayer seized
pursuant to a search warrant will be suppressed.
E. Further Weaknesses in the Accountant-PrivilegeArmor
Although the assistance of a qualified accountant is almost indispensable
in most fraud investigations, the federal courts do not recognize a privilege
with regard to communications made by a taxpayer to his accountant. 274
Indeed, an accountant-client privilege will not be recognized by the federal
courts even in a state which expressly creates such a privilege. 275 Accord-

268. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
269. 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
270. 508 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1974).
271. Hill, 445 F.2d at 146.
272. 459 F.2d 383, 385 (6th Cir. 1972).
273. 470 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1972).
274. For further discussion, see Robert S. Fink, The Role of the Accountant in a
Tax FraudCase, 141 J. Accr. 41 (April 1976).
275. Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734, 741-42 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 346

U.S. 864 (1953).
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ingly, an accountant employed by a taxpayer may be compelled to testify as
to documents submitted, and statements made to him by the taxpayer.27 6
On the other hand, the federal courts do recognize an attorney-client
privilege with one stipulation. Protection may be afforded a taxpayer where
the accountant is hired by his attorney and brought within protection of the
attorney-client privilege.2 "
1. Records in Accountant's Possession
The decision of the Supreme Court in Couch v. United States27 points
up a related problem involving the records of an individual taxpayer in the
possession of her accountant. As stated by Mr. Justice Powell, the question
presented was "whether the taxpayer may invoke her fifth amendment
privilege against compulsory self-incrimination to prevent the production of
her business and tax records in the possession of her accountant. ''279 The
records in question had been given by the taxpayer to her accountant for the
purpose of preparing her income tax returns. ° The Court pointed out,
however, that when the taxpayer surrendered possession "she, of course,
retained title in herself."2' 1
The Supreme Court denied that the privilege was available, holding that
possession rather than "ownership" bears the "closest relationship to the
The Court
personal compulsion forbidden by the Fifth Amendment."'
further stated that the criterion for Fifth Amendment immunity remains "not
the ownership of property but the 'physical or moral compulsion exerted.' We
hold today that no Fourth or Fifth Amendment claim can prevail where, as in
this case, there exists no legitimate expectation of privacy and no semblance
of governmental compulsion against the person of the accused."
When a tax fraud investigation is imminent or in progress, the knowledge
to be gained from Couch is that a taxpayer's records should, to the extent
feasible, be retained in the possession of the taxpayer; or if necessarily taken
to the accountant's office they should be returned to the taxpayer as soon as
possible. The Fifth Amendment privilege can, of course, be invoked by a
taxpayer as to personal records in his own possession.
2. Workpapers in Taxpayer's Possession
The apparently conflicting decisions in the matter of an accountant's
workpapers which are turned over to a taxpayer by his accountant appear to

276. See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984); United
States v. Balistrieri, 403 F.2d 472, 481 (7th Cir. 1968), vacated, 395 U.S. 710 (1969).
277. See Upjohn Co. v. United'States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); United States v.
Kovel, 296 F.2d 918i 922-23 (2d Cir. 1969).
278. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
279. Id. at 323.
280. Id. at 324.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 331.
283. Id. at 336 (citation omitted).
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have been clarified by the Couch decision. 284 Moreover, Judge Hunter in
a concurring and dissenting opinion in United States v. Fisher' made the
following observation:
It is my view therefore that the approach taken by the Ninth Circuit in
Cohen' has been explicitly approved by Couch and comports fully with
the fifth amendment view embraced by the Supreme Court, i.e., that
possession, not ownership, is the significant factor and that the privilege
protects one from having to produce the evidence, though not from its
production. 2 7
Accordingly, where accountant's workpapers are in the possession of the
taxpayer, their production in response to an administrative summons may not
be successfully resisted. While the reasoning of the Kasmir opinion is
convincing and its principles should ultimately prevail, the Supreme Court has
ruled otherwise-i.e., accountant's workpapers in the possession of the
taxpayer are not protected from administrative summons.
F. IncreasingLimits Placed on PrivilegeAgainst Self-Incrimination
The basic restrictions and limitations upon the investigative powers of
special agents arise from the self-incrimination clause of the Fifth Amendment
to the Constitution.
The Constitution imposes a barrier not only to obtaining testimony from
a taxpayer but also to an examination of an individual's books and records.
As early as United States v. Boyd,'m the Supreme Court pointed out that
"we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's private books
and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially different from
compelling him to be a witness against himself."' 9
In a recent decision, Bellis v. United States,2m the Supreme Court
reaffirmed this doctrine in the following language:
It has long been established, of course, that the Fifth Amendment privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination protects an individual from compelled
production of his personal papers and effects as well as compelled oral
testimony ....The privilege applies to the business records of the sole
proprietor or sole practitioner as well as to personal documents291containing
more intimate information about the individual's private life.

284. See Rena C. Cohen,Accountants'Workpapersin FederalTax Investigations,
21 TAx L. REV. 183 (1966).
285. 500 F.2d 683 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. granted,420 U.S. 906 (1975), aff'd, 425
U.S. 391 (1976).
286. Cohen v. United States, 388 F.2d 464 (9th Cir. 1967).
287. Fisher,500 F.2d at 696.
288. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
289. Id. at 617-18.
290. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
291. Id. at 87-88.
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These principles, relating to an individual taxpayer's testimony and
records are, of course, accepted without reservation by the Service. On the
other extreme is the equally well established principle that corporate books
and records are not privileged and are not protected by the Fifth Amendment
privilege, even in the hands of a corporate official who may be the target of
an investigation. 2 The nonprivileged status of corporate records is not
affected by the circumstance that the corporation involved may have, in effect,
a one-man corporate structure, and may be the mere alter ego of its owner; 293 or may be a Subchapter S corporation.294
Between the privileged status of an individual's records and the nonprivileged status of corporate records is an area of controversy and litigation.
For instance, the records of an unincorporated association and a labor union
have been held to be non-privileged, 295 as have been the records of a
Massachusetts trust.29 6 It appears clearly that the trend has been to restrict
and limit the scope of the privilege.
The most recent pronouncement of the Supreme Court on the subject was
made in Bellis v. United States297 which held that the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination was not available in regard to the records
of a dissolved three-man law partnership. In the course of the majority
opinion in Bellis, delivered by Justice Marshall, reference was made to ,a
number of Supreme Court decisions upholding the compelled production of
the records of a variety of organizations over individuals' claims of Fifth
Amendment privilege: "These decisions reflect the Court's consistent view that
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination should be 'limited to its
historic function of protecting only the natural individual from
compulsory
' 298
incrimination through his own testimony or personal records.'
In Bellis, the majority referred to a major theme running through prior
decisions, namely, "protection of individual privacy," and noted that a claim
of privacy or confidentiality cannot be maintained with respect to the financial
records of an organized collective entity. 29 The Court noted that control of
such records is generally strictly regulated by statute and access to the records
is guaranteed to others in the organization."
In referring to the three-man partnership, the Court used such expressions
as "organized institutional identity," "formal institutional arrangement,"
"independent entity with a relatively formal organization," leaving open the
possibility that there are partnerships whose records might be protected by the

292. Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 377-78 (1911).
293. Hair Industry, Ltd. v. United States, 340 F.2d 510, 511 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965).
294. United States v. Mid-West Business Forms, 474 F.2d 722, 723 (8th Cir.
1973); United States v. Richardson, 469 F.2d 349, 350 (10th Cir. 1972).
295. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
296. Anguilo v. Mullins, 338 F.2d 820 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 963
(1965).
297. 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
298. Id. at 89-90 (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 674, 701 (1944)).
299. Id. at 91.
300. Id.
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Fifth Amendment privilege? 0' The Court stated: "[T]his might be a
different case if it involved a small family partnership, or ...if there were
some other
pre-existing relationship of confidentiality among the part0
ners."

Under the circumstances, if records are sought by agents during a tax
fraud investigation, a decision will have to be made whether the records
involved are privileged and whether their production can be resisted in a court
proceeding.
G. Effective Use of the Fifth Amendment as a Defensive Weapon
Although there are many instances of the courts' unwillingness to accept
the Fifth Amendment defense, there are some situations in which the courts
have dismissed a case solely on such grounds. As previously noted,
successful uses have been made of this defense in connection with the client's
records and the accountant's workpapers.
The Fifth Amendment's protection against compulsory self-incrimination
has also been used effectively in a few other types of criminal cases. In
United States v. Sams, 303 the defendant's conviction under section 7203 was
overturned because it was based on his plea of guilty to willful failure to pay
the federal occupational tax imposed on wagering. As was held by the
Supreme Court in Marchetti v. United States,3 4 the wagering statutes "may
not be employed to punish criminally those persons who have defended a
failure to comply with their requirements with a proper assertion of the
privilege against self-incriminations." 30 5 In Sams, this principle was used to
annul a conviction for a guilty plea entered before the Marchetti decision.
This privilege was not waived because the taxpayer entered a guilty plea
at the time of his conviction. The taxpayer at that time could not have known
that his prosecution was constitutionally invalid and therefore his confession
was not "knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made."306 The Court also
held that this constitutional infirmity was essentially more than a procedural
change in the law which did not undermine the basic accuracy of the fact
finding process. Rather, the newly expressed right affected the integrity of the
conviction itself and therefore required its invalidation. The defendant had
more than just the right to remain silent at trial; he also had the right not to
be punished for failure to obey a statute which required an incriminatory act.
In summary, then, while the courts regularly waive the Fifth Amendment
defense, there is still some prospect for success in pursuing such an argument.
In any event, knowledge of the foregoing principles may be of immeasurable
importance in protecting the taxpayer's basic rights during tax fraud
investigations.

301. Id. at 95-97.
302. Id. at 101 (citing United States v. Slutsky, 352 F. Supp. 1105 (S.D.N.Y.
1972)).
303. 521 F.2d 421 (3d Cir. 1975).

304. 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
305. Id. at 42.
306. Id. at 43-44.
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H. Effective Use of the Sixth Amendment as a Defensive Weapon
As a result of the successful use of the Sixth Amendment defense-guarantee of a speedy trial-it is conceivable that the courts may be
likely to grant a defendant's motion to dismiss for unnecessary delay. In
United States v. Blaustein, °7 the court dismissed a tax evasion indictment
where 27 months had transpired between the Court's order to serve a bill of
particulars and produce documents for inspection and the government's full
compliance therewith. Further support for the conclusion that this delay
prejudiced the defendant's case was found in the fact that three material
witnesses had died during the period of the government's delay. Moreover,
the defendant was held not to have waived his right to a speedy trial.
The court in Blaustein cited Rule 4 of the Second Circuit Rules
RegardingPrompt Disposition of Criminal Cases, announced on January 5,
1971, to become effective six months thereafter. 3° Rule 4 provides as
follows:
In all cases the government must be ready for trial within six months from
the date of the arrest, service of summons, detention, or the filing of a
complaint or of a formal charge upon which the defendant is to be tried
(other than a sealed indictment), whichever is earliest. If the government
is not ready for trial within such time, or within the periods as extended by
the district court for good cause, then, upon application of the defendant or
upon motion of the district court, after opportunity for argument, the charge
shall be dismissed. 3 9
Also cited in the Blaustein opinion was a memorandum of December 28,
1970, from the Chief Justice of the United States to all United States judges,
similarly calling for more rapid conclusion of criminal cases.310
Thus, the courts have recognized that the passage of time may place a
peculiar burden on the defendant-taxpayer and his witnesses and their
availability in terms not only of their memories but also of their abilities to
resurrect their records. The problem is one that rests squarely within the
sound discretion of the trial court, and the trend may now be in favor of the
taxpayer.
V. CONCLUSION
In light of what has developed since the 1950's in the criminal tax fraud
area, it is appalling to see how widespread is the failure of taxpayers and their
representatives to apply sound strategies. Moreover, there seemingly persists
the failure to appreciate that, in any event, after the administrative stages are
over, a tax evasion case is no longer a tax case with criminal law aspect;
rather, it is criminal case with tax involvements.

307.
308.
309.
310.

325 F. Supp. 233 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
Id. at 240.
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Id.
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Thus, it is of utmost importance ihat the taxpayer's defense counsel have
knowledge of applicable substantiative law, the investigative process, and the
court's interpretation of these elements. Only then may the taxpayer be
assured his basic constitutional rights.
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